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ABSTRACT 
As the war in Iraq draws to a close, the importance of U.S. indirect influence in the 
Middle East will increase. The large footprint of the U.S. military in the region since 
2003 has proven unsustainable for the long term in terms of stress on the conventional 
Army, acceptability to the population of the Muslim world, and patience of the American 
public. Further, this large-scale conflict, and the focus it has required, has diminished 
American ability to conduct indirect operations elsewhere throughout the U.S. Central 
Command area of responsibility (CENTCOM AOR). Thus, hostile networks have 
unrestricted access to the Middle East, which threatens U.S. interests and the stability of 
the region. Regional engagement provides a means to increase partner nation capacity as 
well as enhance indirect U.S. influence, but the program may not currently be achieving 
optimized, strategically significant gains that SOF have been able to achieve during other 
operations. This research seeks to examine how Special Operations Command Central 
(SOCCENT) might better conduct engagement through regionally coordinated persistent 
presence, and how to implement any suggested changes.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
As the war in Iraq draws to a close, the importance of U.S. indirect influence in 
the Middle East will increase. Unlike post-war Germany or Korea, a large footprint of the 
U.S. military is unsustainable for the long term because of the stress on the conventional 
Army, acceptability to the population of the Muslim world, and patience of the American 
public. Further, the troops, money, and political capital required to prosecute wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have diminished American ability to conduct military operations 
elsewhere throughout the world, especially the Middle East.  Correspondingly, hostile 
networks have increasing influence in the Middle East, which threatens U.S. policy goals 
and the stability of the entire region. The Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) 
provides a means to increase partner nation capacity, as well as enhance indirect U.S. 
influence, but the program is underperforming in the Middle East due to over 
commitment to Major Theater Operations (MTO).   
While most of the U.S. military has focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. 
enemies are building and expanding their Middle Eastern networks to challenge regional 
U.S. security interests.  By focusing on two countries, military engagement to traditional 
areas of responsibility (AOR) has decreased.  This created a rapport vacuum that 
facilitates the growth of U.S. enemies.  International terrorist organizations have become 
a franchise industry by extending ties to regional extremist groups through financing and 
training.  Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Iranian influence progressively 
increase their clout and control, thereby destabilizing or displacing U.S. allies and 
threatening U.S. security.   
Additionally, Arab heads of state provide support for the U.S. wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan at their own jeopardy.  By sanctioning large-scale U.S. military ventures on 
Muslim lands, these Arab leaders open themselves to domestic and international criticism 
by Muslims.  Since adversaries portray the U.S. war against Al-Qaeda as ideological 
aggression by the U.S. against all of Islam, then Arab allies of the West become puppets 
or apostates.  While many Muslims do not believe Al-Qaeda propaganda, they see 
support for non-Muslims over Muslims as a violation of the religious tenets and unjust 
 2 
leadership.  Perceived injustice is often a primary motivation for Jihadi groups ranging 
from the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda to name a few.  But how can the 
U.S. push strategic policy without making matters worse? 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to identify how to optimize the use of U.S. military 
power to achieve strategic goals in the Middle East.  This question will be examined in 
four steps.  First, this study identifies U.S. national security goals in the Middle East and 
the environmental constraints and historical context—regarding U.S. military 
intervention in the region—which must be understood to accomplish those goals.  Next, it 
evaluates which of the U.S. Military‘s available assets is most appropriate to operate 
under those constraints.  Then multiple case studies evaluate if and how SOF contributes 
to the accomplishment of U.S. strategic goals.  Finally, an argument is made for 
redistributing Special Operations Forces (SOF) from current supporting roles in 
Afghanistan and Iraq to primarily supported roles outside of MTOs in order to increase 
SOF strategic utility. Ultimately, this study seeks to identify practical methods that 
maximize SOF contributions to U.S. policy goals. 
Because this is a broad topic, some boundaries must be set on the scope of the 
research.  While there are many agencies and tools that are essential for Internal Defense 
and Development (IDAD) strategies, this study focuses on military to military 
engagements and the ability of small tailored forces to counter hostile non-state actors 
through indirect influence.  This research will consider two preliminary conditions to 
evaluate supporting hypotheses.  First, the host nation must be in a state of less than full-
scale war, which allows SOF to be the supported command or operate independently.  
The other preliminary condition is that the host nation is either a partner state or a 
struggling state.  Partner states are the longtime allies of the U.S. who possess sufficient 
stability, while struggling states are potential U.S. allies who have a measure of internal 
unrest that may become a failed state if the situation gets worse.
1
   
                                                 
1 Anna Simons and others, ―Sovereignty Solution,‖ The American Interest II, no. 4 (March/April 
2007): 36. 
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This thesis uses two hypotheses to determine the effectiveness of regional 
integration and persistence on SOF utility.  First, regionally integrated engagement 
develops both U.S. SOF–Foreign Partner Forces (FPF) and FPF–FPF relationships, 
creating networks of influence that counter enemy networks and prevents future conflicts, 
thus promoting U.S. policy goals.  Regional integration aims to maximize the 
participation and partnership of as many security forces as possible, throughout the 
region, toward a common set of goals. Second, as the persistence of military-to-military 
engagements increases, FPF capability as well as U.S. SOF–FPF Network of Influence 
(NOI) increases, which prevents future conflicts and facilitates interoperability, thus 
promoting of U.S. interests.  Persistence is a measure of both the frequency and duration 
of productive military to military engagement between U.S. SOF and FPF.  This research 
evaluates the importance of regional integration and persistence in SOF effectiveness. 
These hypotheses cannot be evaluated without some modest assumptions.  The 
first assumption is that the Special Operations Component CENTCOM (SOCCENT) 
Commander has the ability and influence to change the current utilization of SOF in the 
Middle East in order to maximize SOF strategic utility.  Second, that key Middle Eastern 
states want to work with U.S. SOF.  Finally, the U.S. State Department, specifically the 
Ambassadors to those key countries, value the SOF contribution to TSCP but want SOF 
utilized in their countries modestly.  
The product of this thesis is a set of operational elements that can increase the 
strategic utilization of SOF.  This thesis intends to demonstrate how SOF employment 
can increase both networks of influence and capability in partner nation security forces, 
in order to prevent future conflict and increase U.S. influence with peer allies, thus 
increasing U.S. national security by achieving strategic goals.  Effective military to 
military engagement by U.S. SOF in the Middle East is a cost effective alternative to 
massive troop commitments at a time when U.S. citizens have war fatigue and financial 
resources are increasingly limited.  SOCCENT can maximize strategic utility of its forces 
when it employs them in the indirect and supported role, outside MTO, for regionally 
coordinated and persistent engagements. 
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B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses two cases studies, Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines 
(OEF-P) and U.S. SOF in Central America during the 1980s, to evaluate the strategic 
utility of U.S. SOF.  Each case study is examined using a background, force structure, 
mission, and analysis format.  Background includes both the U.S. policy goals that drove 
U.S. intervention in the region and the initial conditions that U.S. forces encountered 
there.  The force structure centers primarily on the command and control structure and 
the organization of operational forces.  Mission describes the types of operations 
conducted by U.S. SOF.  The analysis portion assesses the effectiveness of U.S. forces to 
promote strategic goals.  Sources of literature used are books, journals, and other 
historical articles.  Most of these sources exist in unclassified form. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II defines existing policy goals, and regional constraints associated with 
the methods for accomplishing these goals.   This chapter begins by evaluating the 
military‘s role in America‘s Grand Strategy using the National Security Strategy, 
National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy.  After defining the goals and 
roles of the military, attention shifts to the success and consequences of U.S. military 
intervention in the Middle East since 1980.  This chapter will explain why large-scale 
troop deployments to Muslim lands are counter-productive and threaten U.S. policy 
goals.   
Chapter III discusses the advantages that Special Operations Forces have when 
operating in a politically sensitive environment. 
Chapters IV and V are case studies where the United States conducted military 
engagement, using relatively small force packages, in order to accomplish strategic 
policy goals.  Chapter IV investigates how U.S. military assistance in the Philippines 
since 2002 (OEF-P) counters Al Qaeda affiliate groups.  Chapter V assesses how U.S. 




operations in Central and South America during the 1980s and 1990s.  Chapter VI will 
then summarize these findings and determine trends in the efficient use of SOF military 
engagement.  
Chapter VII seeks to apply the findings of these case studies to U.S. military 
engagement in the Middle East.  The utilization of Special Operations Forces in the 
Middle East will be prescribed in two zones, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula, using 
current means of SOF employment. These prescriptions will come with recommendations 
for SOF employment that would further enhance military engagement.  The final chapter 
will conclude this paper with a review of the research, findings, recommendations, and 
areas for further research related to this topic.  
 6 
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II. U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The Middle East is of critical importance to United States‘ security goals. Access 
to oil, control of key lines of communication, potential for conflict between states, and 
the growth of non-state extremist networks require U.S. action to shape outcomes 
favorable to American interests. However, recent large-scale military commitments in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have proven more costly—both in financial and human capital—
than is politically sustainable. Additionally, the American people are less likely to 
support long-term military intervention in a post War on Terror world.  Further, large-
scale American footprints in the Muslim world remain unacceptable to local Arab 
populations, and thus jeopardize high-profile military partnerships with Arab Allies. 
Therefore, the U.S. Military should seek to provide a cost efficient and politically 
acceptable strategy to promote America‘s interests in this politically sensitive and 
complicated environment. 
Andre Beaufre defines strategy as ―the art of applying force so that it makes the 
most effective contribution towards achieving the ends set by public policy.‖2 In other 
words, this study must first examine American policy goals in the Middle East, determine 
the means available—especially given recent large-scale regional operations and U.S. 
domestic concerns—and then determine the most efficient ways in which to employ 
military means, taking into account political and cultural considerations of regional 
actors. 
A. U.S. INTERESTS 
The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) lays out a path to promote America‘s 
policy goals for the following 4 years. In military terms, this document provides the 
Commander in Chief‘s guidance for subordinate leaders to conduct strategic planning, 
allocate resources, and direct their efforts.  Based on the guidance from the NSS, the 
 
 
                                                 
2 Andre Beafre, Introduction to Strategy (New York: Fredrick A. Prager, 1965), 22. 
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Department of Defense generates the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National 
Military Strategy (NMS).  Taken together, these three documents direct the military‘s 
role in America‘s Grand Strategy. 
Within these documents four policy goals are specified; two goals focus on 
opposing America‘s adversaries, while two focus on strengthening her allies.  First, as the 
NMS states, ―(the U.S. Military) will support efforts to counter transnational and sub-
state militant groups.‖3 Al Qaeda and various affiliated extremist organizations continue 
to be present in various sizes and levels of effectiveness throughout the region. Recent 
operations by newer Al Qaeda affiliates (e.g., Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) 
demonstrate that the loosely confederated organization has the ability to strike at 
American interests even when the central leadership is not involved. Therefore, one of 
America‘s goals is to gain and maintain intelligence on these organizations, and pursue 
them wherever they are in order to disrupt or defeat their ability to threaten American 
interests. 
Second, the United States seeks to check the growing regional aims of an Iranian 
regime that continues to seek nuclear weapons,
4
 acts as a destabilizing force in the 
Levant
5
, and pursues greater influence and dominance in the eastern Arabian Peninsula
6
. 
This Iranian malfeasance often creates greater instability within key United States allies 
and is antithetical to U.S. interests. However, Iran rarely undertakes these efforts overtly 
or directly; rather, they operate by proxies in an efficient and politically savvy way. 
Third, the United States seeks to ―Shape the Choices of Key States.‖7 Shaping is 
the process by which the U.S. seeks to influence the actions and perceptions of key allies 
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Defense, United States National Military Strategy, 2011 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2011), 11. 
4 NMS 2011, 11. 
5  David Petraeus, ―The Posture of U.S. Central Command,‖ (testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Washington, D.C., March 16, 2010). 
6 Breitbart, ―Gulf states denounce Iran‘s meddling,‖ April 4, 2008, 
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=CNG.27d8269a87e82e558f6f222e87a9d9a8.521&show_article=1 
(accessed June 1, 2011). 
7 U.S. Department of Defense, United States National Defense Strategy, 2010 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2010), 8. 
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and adversaries. While the State Department is the primary agency for shaping 
international consensus and coalition building, the United States Military has a crucial 
role in developing military security partnerships and shaping the behavior of those 
partners. Enabling and encouraging social, economic, and human rights reforms among 




Fourth, the NSS and NMS specifically list the need to build partner capacity as a 
U.S. policy goal. This helps our allies defend themselves from domestic threats, external 
hostility, as well as various transnational extremist networks. The intent of this goal is to 
reduce requirements for American intervention in the Middle East through collective and 
cooperative security arrangements, ideally deterring hostile forces from aggression. 
The security of the United States is tightly bound up with the security of 
the broader international system. As a result, our strategy seeks to build 
the capacity of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats 
and external aggression while improving the capacity of the international 




An unstated, but critical goal is to anticipate and obviate crises in politically 
significant locations.  The regional tumult spreading through partner and hostile states 
during the ―Arab Spring‖ of 2011 illustrates that the Middle East remains a politically 
volatile area. Governments long believed to be stable, such as Egypt, were suddenly 
replaced with elements largely unknown to the United States. Therefore, it is in American 
interests to maintain a greater information network that increases awareness, anticipates 
conflict, and possibly prevents destabilization within Middle Eastern states.  Such a 
network could resolve crises in a manner that maximizes U.S. opportunities.  
Accomplishing these goals requires a long-term American commitment, making 
constant—albeit sometimes slow—progress. As the cases examined later in this study 
will illustrate, defeating complex non-state threats with roots in preexisting social 
                                                 
8 Petraeus, ―The Posture of U.S. Central Command.‖ 
9 U.S. Department of Defense, United States National Defense Strategy, 2008 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2008), 6. 
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conflicts often requires persistent effort over the course of many years. Additionally, 
these cases will show that attempts to transform attitudes regarding human rights in 
partner nations often achieve success incrementally through interaction and example by 
American forces. Also, maintenance of a regional network would require constant effort 
lest the relationships upon which it is based become strained or forgotten. Thus, future 
U.S. military efforts must recognize the need for long term engagement in the Middle 
East. 
B. CONSTRAINTS OF THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 
Given the broad geographic and demographic expanses of the Middle East, one 
may conclude that a massive commitment of military power is necessary to accomplish 
each of the five stated goals. However, this may not be a politically acceptable or a 
possible course of action. Large-scale conflicts such as recently experienced in Iraq and 
have Afghanistan are costly in terms of monetary expense, commitment of the military, 
and American political capitol internationally. In financial terms alone, the two theatres 
have cost a combined $1.12 trillion
10
 or roughly 7.8 % of U.S. Gross Domestic Product.
11
 
In terms of commitment of military power, the U.S. effort in Iraq had, at its height, 
roughly 23% of active duty Soldiers and Marines deployed as part of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.
12
 Operation Enduring Freedom required an additional commitment of 12% of 
active duty Soldiers and Marines.
13
  Furthermore, recent polls demonstrate that 
Americans are weary of these military commitments and many have come to believe U.S. 
                                                 
10 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 
9/11 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 1. 
11 International Monetary Fund, ―World Economic Outlook Database 2009,‖ Report for Selected 
Countries and Subjects, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2006&ey=2009&scsm=1&ssd
=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=111&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp
=0&a=&pr.x=64&pr.y=8 (accessed 3 NOV 2010). 
12 ―Number of U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Exceeds that in Iraq for the First Time,‖ Washington Post, 
May 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/24/AR2010052403842.html (accessed 3 NOV 2010) 
13 Ibid. 
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military action to be a mistake.
14
  The cost of this sustained monetary, human, and 
political capital has prompted U.S. policymakers to seek more efficient ways of achieving 
security goals in the coming years.  Therefore, any effort to pursue American interests in 
the Middle East with conventional military forces will be met with strong domestic 
opposition. 
Additionally, regional considerations specific to the Middle East restrict the use of 
large conventional forces to pursue U.S. interests short of war.  Much like other regions, 
the colonial history of the Middle East predisposes it to hypersensitivity toward Western 
militaries within their borders.  Consequently, Middle Eastern Jihadi Ideologues exploit 
this sensitivity greater than anywhere else in the world.  Prominent Jihadi writings focus 
on injustices associated with Western military presence in Islamic holy lands, and 
criticism of foreign backed Middle Eastern leaders.  Tracing popular backlash toward 
U.S. military intervention in the Middle East over the past 30 years shows increasing 
animosity and conflict through three foreign policy eras: Over the Horizon, Dual 
Containment, and Direct Intervention.  While large scale U.S. military presence in the 
Middle East accomplished U.S. goals in each era, it jeopardized long-term security and 
stability by encouraging the growth of Anti-American sentiment, and Islamic radicalism 
1. Over the Horizon 
The first major military intervention is Operation Earnest Will, which occurred 
during the U.S. foreign policy era characterized as Over The Horizon engagement.  This 
policy was also known as the Guam/Nixon Doctrine, whereby the United States would 
support select allies and provide them whatever non-combat support short of nukes that 
they needed to safeguard U.S. interests.
15
  Beginning in approximately 1971, the U.S. 
military remained within striking range of Middle East but out of sight, stationed in 
places like Turkey and Diego Garcia.  The U.S. provided support to key allies, 
specifically the Shah‘s Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey, who would stabilize the 
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region and promote U.S. objectives.  This policy officially lasted until President Clinton 
changed U.S. foreign policy to Dual Containment in 1993.  This era witnessed several 
conflicts between the U.S. Middle East policy and Islamists or Jihadis, however, 
Operation Earnest Will was a watershed for U.S. military intervention in the Middle East. 
Under Operation Earnest Will, President Reagan approved the Kuwaiti 
government‘s request to reflag their oil tankers as American ships in 1987 in order to 
protect Kuwaiti oil exports from Iranian attack.  While reflagging maritime vessels was 
an accepted practice internationally, it was not common for the U.S. to participate.  
During the course of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran had repeatedly attacked Kuwaiti oil 
production and transportation infrastructure in order to punish Kuwait for supporting 
Iraq.  As a result, Kuwaiti oil exports had dropped from 2 million barrels per day to only 
300 barrels per day.
16
  Kuwait could no longer economically tolerate this decreased level 
of production, yet was unable to protect itself from Iran‘s aggression.  So, it turned to 
U.S. to request protection by reflagging their tankers.  Reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers 
under the U.S. flag would provide justification for U.S. Naval protection for Kuwait‘s 
tankers, and to perhaps bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war.
17
  Initially, President Reagan 
rejected Kuwait‘s request, but he reconsidered when Kuwait subsequently approached the 
Soviet Union with the same request.
18
 Reflagging the tankers led to increased U.S. Naval 
presence in the Persian Gulf in order to block Communist expansion into the Middle East 
and ensure the regular flow of oil. 
Prior to requesting U.S. assistance, Kuwait had drawn a fine and strong line 
against Western intervention or encroachment in their country since they gained their 
independence in 1961.
19
  As a result, national sensitivity toward Western naval vessels 
docking at Kuwaiti ports was very high.  Indeed, ―In the 1980s, any large U.S. military 
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presence in the Gulf was considered dangerous to local rulers.‖20  ―When the U.S. asked 
for port facilities, Kuwait refused for fear of inciting rejectionists in Kuwait and the rest 
of the Middle East.‖21  Initially, Kuwait only allowed the United States Navy to refuel at 
sites off shore, but eventually the need for maintenance and other supplies justified 
docking at port.
22
  While great efforts were made to conceal or minimize this from the 
public, word got out.  Kuwaiti rejectionists, university faculty, and students characterized 
the U.S. role in reflagging as imperialist and an attempt at Western recolonization.
23
 
While reflagging may have ensured the continuous flow of oil through the Persian 
Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, it jeopardized the credibility of the Kuwaiti government, 
and inflamed anti-American sentiment.  The Kuwaiti government was already unpopular 
for dismissing Parliament in 1986.
24
  Additionally, Iran had encouraged rebellion in 
Kuwait through their disenfranchised Shia population.
25
  High profile conflicts between 
USN vessels and Iraq or Iran also fueled anti-American sentiment.  The Iraqi attack on 
the USS Stark set the conditions for the USS Vincennes to mistakenly shoot-down 
Iranian flight 655, killing 290 civilians.  It is clear that these incidents served to 
jeopardize public support for the Kuwaiti government, increase the divide between the 
U.S. and Iran, and increase anti-American sentiments. 
2. Dual Containment 
Under President Clinton, the U.S. adapted its Middle East engagement strategy to 
one of Dual Containment, where the U.S. used military forces based in the Persian Gulf 
and Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) to militarily contain Iraq, and enforce 
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economic sanctions designed to politically and ideologically contain Iran.
26
  Operation 
Desert Storm inaugurated the Dual Containment era.  This policy era saw greater 
conflicts between the United States and Jihadis than the previous era.  However, it was 
Operations Desert Storm and Southern Watch that were the greatest catalysts for anti-
American sentiment and perceived injustice by the Arab populace. 
Only months after the conclusion of the Iran–Iraq War, Saddam Hussein invaded 
Kuwait.  After a U.S.-led coalition of over 400,000 troops expelled Iraqi forces during 
Operation Desert Storm, the Kuwaiti government signed a military defense pact with the 
United States.  This pact permitted unrestricted arms sales to Kuwait, training for the 
Kuwaiti military, as well as docking rights for USN vessels at Kuwaiti ports, and 
prepositioning of 60 tanks and 400 vehicles.  This pact set the precedent for similar 
agreements with Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
27
  
Additionally, Saudi Arabia ordered $25 billion of U.S. arms, and allowed 60 U.S. Air 
Force planes to base out of the Kingdom.
28
  These pacts provided U.S. security for GCC 
countries and facilitated Operation Southern Watch, the mission to enforce a UN 
sanctioned no-fly zone in Iraq designed to protect the Shia south. 
As a result of Operation Desert Storm and Southern Watch, anti-American 
sentiment and opposition to the Saudi government increased.  ―Never before had U.S. 
ground troops in such numbers been stationed in the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia].‖29  
Even during the Operation Earnest Will, the Saudis refused basing rights to U.S. forces.
30
  
Opposition to the monarchy grew despite Saudi efforts to conceal and deny the 
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continuing U.S. military presence in the Kingdom, the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries 
of Islam.  Reflecting popular sentiment, over 100 Islamic political activists signed a 1992 
Memorandum of Advice directed to King Fahd, calling his foreign policy decisions un-
Islamic.
31
  During this time, Osama Bin Laden capitalized on this sentiment by issuing 
several statements denouncing the Saudi monarchy and the United States, to include his 
Declaration of Jihad and World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad against Jews and 
Crusaders.  The Saudi dilemma is that they need the United States. for its international 




3. Direct Intervention 
Al Qaeda‘s attack of the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 
2001 prompted President Bush to change U.S. foreign policy from Dual Containment to 
Direct Intervention.  The third major military commitment is Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF), the quintessential example of the Direct Intervention era of U.S. Foreign Policy.  
He adopted a strategy of preemption, unilateral action, and regime change to combat Al 
Qaeda and any threat to America.  Military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, 
and the Philippines are examples of this policy in action.  But OIF is the model of this era 
of U.S. foreign policy. 
The policy of Direct Intervention threatened governments who supported 
terrorism against the United States with military action.  Most notable was Bush‘s ‗Axis 
of Evil,‘ specifically Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.33  After making a strong case for 
regime change in Iraq before the U.S. Congress and U.N., President Bush ordered the 
execution of OIF.  On March 20, 2003, over 150,000 troops invaded Iraq, seized 
Baghdad by April 9 and conquered the whole country by May 1.
34
  However, Saddam 
Hussein and various Jihadi groups had prepared to conduct an insurgency against 
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American forces prior to the invasion.  Saddam had cached arms, munitions and money 
throughout Iraq, and instructed his military to conduct guerrilla warfare when defeated on 
the conventional battlefield.
35
  Abu Musab al-Zarqawi arrived in Iraq around May 2002 
to establish his local support networks, claiming that the American invasion of Iraq was 
inevitable.
36
  After American forces invaded, Saddam and Zarqawi regularly 
corresponded with various Arab and Western media outlets, calling on Muslims to take 
up their Islamic duty and fight.
37
     
While conventional U.S. military were necessary to successfully replace the 
Saddam regime with a fledgling democracy, it came with a much higher cost than anyone 
planned for.  One of the most significant casualties of OIF was the sympathy that the 
United States garnered as a result of the 9/11 bombings.  Public opinion polls 
demonstrate outrage over the occupation of Iraq.  Pew Global Attitudes project reported 
that U.S. global image plummeted after the invasion of Iraq, especially in Muslim 
countries, including U.S. allies Turkey and Jordan.
38
  This increase in hostility toward 
America for its invasion of Iraq provided a golden opportunity for jihadis seeking to 
shape public opinion to their favor. 
Also, Sheik Yusuf Qaradawi‘s reversal of support for U.S. military action as a 
result of OIF demonstrates the high cost of grand military intervention.  Sheik Qaradawi 
is the most influential Islamist cleric in the world, with an audience numbering in the 
hundreds of millions.
39
  His progressive views also include support for democracy, 
women‘s rights, U.S. Muslims serving in the military, and repeatedly denounces Al 
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Qaeda.  In contrast, Qaradawi‘s views on the OIF best exemplify how a large U.S. 
military footprint in a Muslim land incites anti-Americanism, and support for Islamists 
and Jihadis.  In response to invading Iraq he said, ―By God, I was sympathetic with the 
Americans from the beginning… But truthfully, I didn‘t imagine then that America 
would go on to declare a war against the world.‖40  Qaradawi‘s views on the American 
invasion of Iraq provide compelling evidence of how use of conventional U.S. forces can 
jeopardize long-term national interests in the region. 
Indeed, Princeton University Middle East scholar, Professor Bernard Lewis 
warned, ―there are signs of a return among Muslims to what they perceive as the cosmic 
struggle for world domination between the two main faiths—Christianity and Islam.‖41  
This perception of a cosmic struggle is certainly influenced by Jihadi rhetoric aimed at 
capitalizing on U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-
Zawahiri have consistently used the presence of American military forces in Iraq to 
inspire Muslims to take up the banner of jihad and garner support for Al Qaeda.
42
  Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi was relatively unknown prior to the OIF.  However, the American 
invasion of Iraq elevated Zarqawi to international celebrity jihadi status, and eventually 
that of a holy martyr.
43
  Studies by the Saudi government and an Israeli think tank drew 
the same conclusion, ―that the majority of foreign fighters were not Jihadis before the 
Iraq war, but were radicalized by the war itself.‖44   
While the Direct Intervention clearly accomplished its stated goal of Iraqi regime 
change, disapproval for the United States grew throughout the Middle East as a result of 
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it.  The U.S. military should generate a scalable option of military intervention to 
promote both immediate and long-term U.S. strategic interests. 
C. A FOURTH OPTION 
In all of the three of these foreign policy periods, the U.S. military was well 
prepared for decisive kinetic operations, or war, designed to coerce a change to 
unacceptable behavior or conditions.  The aforementioned conflicts testify to 
conventional military force suitability for and capability to resolve these conflicts.  
However, these three policy periods also demonstrate that the interwar years lacked 
sufficient preemptive engagement tools that monitor and support desirable conditions or 
influence a change to less desirable behavior.  These examples indicate that conventional 
forces are ill suited to conduct non-war activities where engagement is a priority.  
Excepted is the highly technical skill sets, such as aviation support, that resides solely in 
the conventional military.   
The U.S. needs a fourth model to promote strategic interests in the Middle East.  
This model should address preemptive engagement activities that ensure the security and 
stability of regional partners and interests in the interwar years.  As the NSS states, 
Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will 
continue to underwrite global security—through our commitments to allies, partners, and 
institutions; our focus on defeating al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and around the globe; and our determination to deter aggression and prevent the 
proliferation of the world‘s most dangerous weapons. As we do, we must recognize that 
no one nation—no matter how powerful—can meet global challenges alone. As we did 
after World War II, America must prepare for the future, while forging cooperative 
approaches among nations that can yield results.
45
  
In this model, the United States will create strategic partnerships to promote our 
interests, and share responsibility for maintaining international stability.  Furthermore, 
this model should provide scalable options to address crisis situations ranging from 
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peacetime to low-level conflict to war.  It should also be sustainable in terms of financial 
and manpower costs, as well as promote legitimacy of political allies and respect cultural 
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III. SOF AS THE FORCE OF CHOICE 
The conditions laid out in Chapter II present a fairly small policy needle hole that 
must be threaded in order to accomplish American goals without causing greater or even 
unforeseen damage to long term interests. Andre Beaufre wrote that ―[t]he art of strategy 
consists in choosing the most suitable means from those available … to achieve the moral 
effect required.‖46 In other words, while the American Military has any number of units, 
platforms and capabilities at its disposal, many are not appropriate for the task at hand for 
reasons discussed previously. The United States must seek to engage the Middle East 
with units that can achieve the policy demands, with means that are politically acceptable 
both domestically and internationally, and in a way that does not detract from other 
military requirements. While these may appear to present an unattainable standard, the 
United States does in fact have the perfect tool for these conditions. 
A. POLICY DEMANDS 
First, SOF thrive in environments where policy demands are high and 
conventional force options are low.  The previous chapter discussed the various policy 
demands that the U.S. government deems essential, to include combating extremist 
groups and promoting U.S. interests and values.  One has to understand the nature of 
extremist groups and Iranian influence in the Middle East in order to effectively counter 
them.  International terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, are franchise industries that extend ties to local groups 
through ideology, financing, and training. Defeating these networks of extremism 
requires a network of indigenous security forces that can adapt as quickly as the enemy.
47
  
Short of war, the U.S. military cannot utilize conventional forces to combat these 
networked groups because of constraints associated with state sovereignty and high 
financial costs.  Further, the previous chapter also demonstrated how conventional 
military commitments can be extremely offensive to Middle Easterners to include U.S. 
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allies.  Use of these forces is actually counterproductive to promoting U.S. values and 
building effective alliances.  So what option does the U.S. military have besides 
conventional forces? 
Scholar and grand strategist Dr. Colin Gray states, ―The mixture of regional 
instability, continuing U.S. interest in international order, and a reduced scale of 
conventional forces suggests an increase in the use of SOF.‖48  The U.S. clearly has 
interests in the stability and security of the Middle East, and the uprisings of the Arab 
Spring in 2011 demonstrate that Middle East stability is always in jeopardy.   
Further, SOF have the skill sets necessary to conduct missions ranging from direct 
intervention to indirect intervention.  Direct operations are the mission sets where 
security forces seek to defeat opponents through direct confrontation, requiring speed, 
surprise, stealth, and the precision application of force.  These mission sets include raids, 
ambushes, cordons and searches, and special reconnaissance.  Conversely, indirect 
operations are mission sets where security forces seek to defeat opponents by and through 
partner forces or various rapport building and manipulation activities, requiring cross-
cultural engagement, the ability to train others, and the ability to work with indigenous 
populations.
49
  These missions include Foreign Internal Defense, Psychological 
Operations, Civil-Military operations.   
Two characteristics of strategic utility of SOF are the ability to shape and enable 
the environment, and to disrupt and defeat threats.
50
  Specifically, the strategic utility of 
indirect SOF operations has two faces, prevention of future conflicts
51
 and production 
and management of FPF forces for use in unavoidable conflicts.  SOF ability to build 
partner capacity of struggling states increases the ability of those states to disrupt 
emerging threats before those threats become an international concern. 
                                                 
48 Colin S. Gray, ―Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations 
Succeed?,‖ Parameters, Spring 1999, 4. 
49 Michele Malvesti, ―To Serve the Nation U.S. Special Operations Forces in an era of persistent 
conflict,‖ (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 11. 
50 Malvesti, ―To Serve the Nation,‖ 3, 15. 
51 Ibid.,  9. 
 23 
While the National SOF (NSOF) have maximum utility in Direct Action, Theater 
SOF (TSOF) are at maximum utility in the indirect arena.  The SOCCENT Commander 
controls TSOF in the CENTCOM AOR, which typically includes U.S. Army Special 
Forces (USSF), Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Marine Special 
Operations Command (MARSOC), Naval Special Warfare (NSW or SEALs).  TSOF are 
―designed to maintain persistent presence and cultivate long-term military-to-military 
relationships within their respective regions.‖52  These relationships and cultural skills are 
ideal for building counter-extremist networks, and promote U.S values among allies. 
B. POLITICAL SENSITIVITY 
Second, employing SOF in the Middle East is more acceptable domestically and 
internationally.  SOF is specially trained to operate in these politically sensitive 
environments.  Gray makes the point that SOF is an appealing force for politicians 
because it is a comparatively low cost—high return option to conventional military 
forces.
53
  Current domestic opposition to protracted military commitments often does not 
extend to the employment of SOF.  Indeed, the American people have demonstrated little 
objection to the current use of SOF in Columbia, the Philippines, and Yemen.   
Further, the use of host nation partner forces is both cost effective and politically 
palatable.
54
  In many Middle Eastern countries, military elites have a great deal of 
influence in the gray area where politics and defense matters merge.  As such, military to 
military engagement between U.S. SOF and foreign military officers offers an 
opportunity to shape and influence Middle Eastern countries in order to support U.S. 
interests.  This is significant in the Middle East where jihadi adversaries portray the 
current War against Al Qaeda as an ideological aggression by the United States against 
all of Islam.  Thus, increasing partnerships with Muslim allies undermines this 
propaganda, provided that allies are seen as true partners and not puppets. 
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Further, SOF are a more palatable military option internationally due to cultural 
engagement skills and small force footprints.  These assets make military intervention 
appear as an effort to respect and cooperate, rather than occupy and demand.  The 
Warrior-Diplomats of TSOF are selected and trained for cultural interaction and language 
proficiency, and on average have greater experience with negotiations and influence 
operations.  Should the environment necessitate direct intervention then NSOF is 
rigorously trained and amply resourced to maximize the execution of covert and 
clandestine missions. Simply put, these units are the only U.S. military force designed, 
selected, trained and resourced to operate in these environments. 
C. OPPORTUNITY COST 
Third, conventional military and TSOF units were originally designed to 
accomplish very different missions—missions that require almost antithetical means to 
accomplish. As Dr. Hy Rothstein wrote, 
Decisive operations are coercive by nature. They involve the direct 
application of military power to compel an adversary to accede to the will 
of the United States and, when applicable, its allies.  Regional 
engagement, on the other hand, is characterized by a different dynamic, 
that of influence.  Regional engagement involves the discriminate, and 
often indirect, application of military power to persuade, encourage, guide, 
manipulate, or otherwise influence adversaries, allies, or neutrals to act in 
a manner consistent with, or supportive of, U.S. national interests.
55
 
Thus, there is an inherent opportunity cost associated when ad hoc General 
Purpose Forces (GPF) units, designed to perform decisive operations, are used in a 
different role. 
Recently, during Major Theater Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has 
been some blurring between the traditional roles and missions of SOF and General 
Purpose Forces. Conventional Army Soldiers on Transition Teams found themselves 
training and advising Iraqi and Afghan security forces, a role traditional associated with 
Special Forces. Likewise, SOF were often utilized to target tactical level insurgents in a 
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manner that did not maximize their unique skill sets. While these conflicts necessitated 
this peculiar arrangement, it is by no means ideal or advantageous. In fact, this role 
reversal detracts from the raison d’être of both forces, thus degrading America‘s ability 
to conduct Beaufre‘s definition of strategic art.  
While the massive scope of recreating the Iraqi Army required GPF Soldiers to 
adopt these nonstandard training roles, this mission did in fact mean that Infantrymen 
were not performing Infantry tasks. Now as the United States looks past the short term 
need for this deviation in traditional mission, it should not seek to exacerbate the 
problem. Specifically, the Army should seek to retain the capabilities of the finest Army 
in the world, rather than sacrifice regular war fighting capabilities on the altar of irregular 
warfare. Recently, Army brigades—whose traditional mission is to close with and 
destroy conventional enemy formations and who have neither a traditional nor doctrinal 
mission of working ―by, with and through‖ partner forces—have begun reforming 
themselves as Advise and Assist Brigades (AAB) with the new mission of conducting 
Security Force Assistance. This reorganization requires types of training—such as ―city 
management courses, civil affairs training and border patrol classes‖56—that are 
obviously not in keeping with the traditional roles of conventional combat arms. While 
some believe conventional units should retain the Security Force Assistance (SFA) 
mission for shaping operations and operations other than war after the current conflicts,
57
 
this use detracts from GPF units‘ ability to train and prepare for the next large scale 
conflict. As GEN Casey, outgoing Chief of Staff of the Army stated, non-standard use of 
conventional units has left them, ―a little rusty at the battalion and brigade staff 
integration and synchronization skills.‖58  
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Further, the high intensity of repetitive deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have 
taken their toll on GPF and have made the prospect of further perpetual commitments 
untenable. In fact, those current deployments of GPF to Iraq and Afghanistan would be 
unsustainable were it not for a short-term increase in Army manpower by 22,000. 
However, the Army‘s conventional units will be forced to cut 49,000 Soldiers from 
current strength by 2016.
59
  These reductions make the prospect of persistent presence by 
an already strained and further shrinking Army an unfeasible option.  
Just as unconventional use of conventional forces dulls the skills they require, 
SOF employment in Afghanistan and Iraq have limited their availability to conduct 
traditional Special Operations missions in other areas, specifically in the arena of military 
to military engagement short of war.  Currently, 84% of all SOF are committed to 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
60
  Further, their mission set only reflects a fraction of their 
capability and is challenged by external restrictions.  Specifically, SOF currently act in 
support of GPF, compete with SOF to influence and advise the same FPF, thereby 
degrading the strategic value of SOF.
61
  While SOF make significant contributions in 
these theaters, these contributions are often diminished returns in an environment flush 
with kinetic capabilities. Thus, these repetitive and manpower intensive requirements 
often bring benefit on the margins in these Major Theater Operations. SOF could be used 
to greater effect in an alternative manner, one that reflects core competencies in Irregular 
Warfare and addresses lesser-known threats.   
By attempting to blur the lines between traditional roles—and by extension the 
operations in which each can achieve greatest utility—SOF and GPF are often working in 
a redundant or inefficient manner. This creates a greater cost for lesser gains than would 
be accomplished by an alternative plan in which each focuses on their primary skills and 
core competencies and in which each operated in environments most suitable to those 
skills. Using AABs to build partner capacity can be done if U.S. units partner with forces 
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one level up. In other words, an American platoon can train a partner nation company; an 
American company can train a partner nation battalion.
62
  The extraordinary inefficiency 
in this can be appreciated when one considers the same host nation battalion can be 
effectively trained by a GPF company (roughly 130 Soldiers) or can be trained and 
advised by a single Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFOD-A) made up of 
12 Soldiers.   
Additionally, the nexus of the current environment in the Middle East—below the 
threshold of war—and the long-term commitment required to accomplish the previously 
listed strategic goals create conditions which are better suited for theater SOF to be 
optimally utilized and in which GPF would be inefficient at best, and at worst working 
against America‘s long term interests. Table 1 demonstrates the relative utility of SOF vs. 
GPF in conflicts that vary in both intensity and duration. 
Table 1.   Utility of SOF Vs. GPF in Various Conflicts 






















Therefore, Theater SOF is demonstrably the force of choice for the phase zero 
shaping operations required to accomplish America‘s future goals in Middle East. 
However, merely identifying the appropriate tool does not lead to a plan for the region. 
Now that the ―who‖ has been identified, the ―how‖ must be addressed. In fact, SOF can 
be misapplied to a problem in ways that accomplish little to no gains. In recent years, 
partly because of commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, theater SOF would engage 
Middle Eastern partner forces on a sporadic, interrupted basis which has had questionable 
                                                 
62 Escandon, The future of Security Force Assistance, 84. 
 28 
value in building enduring relationships—thus making shaping more difficult—and has 
not created maximum increases in partner capacity. Therefore, in order to achieve long 
term gains, Theater SOF must engage as many partner forces in the region as is 
politically acceptable in a persistent manner in order to build partner capacity, defeat and 
disrupt transnational threats and shape the perceptions of both partner and adversary 





IV. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM—PHILIPPINES 
A. BACKGROUND 
The combined efforts of the Philippine military and U.S. Special Operations 
Forces provide several learning points about how a persistent small force can have 
strategic impact.  The Philippines are similar to the Middle East in various ways, 
including a colonial history that increases the political sensitivity of U.S. military 
operations there.  The Philippines gained their independence from the United States in 
1946 and subsequently went through a period with unpopular national leadership 
beholden to the United States as their Cold War benefactor.  Additionally, the Philippines 
has numerous ethnic and religious groups who were all put under the governance of 
overwhelmingly Catholic government with only token representation of the non-Christian 
populace.
63
  This led to strong distrust of their previous colonial masters, which is most 
evident by a constitutional clause prohibiting foreign militaries from conducting combat 
operations within the Philippine borders.  However, it was not until 1992 that Philippine 
sovereignty issues came to a head and U.S. forces closed all bases and reduced their 
patronage and influence over the Philippine government (GRP).  Almost a decade passed 
before Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo reengaged with the U.S. military.  





The Philippines is typical of Southeast Asia in that it is an area that lends itself to 
Al Qaeda franchise development due to a large Muslim population within a region of 
ethnic fault lines and loose political control. Indeed, within the Philippine islands there is 
an Al Qaeda affiliate network with links to several Southeast Asian countries.  While 
there are four main insurgent factions with numerous of splinter groups, the Moro Islamic 
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Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are 
the primary sources of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and are linked to Al Qaeda.  
MILF is ―the strongest and most active insurgent group in the southern 
Philippines, as well as the most vocally anti-American.‖65  It is a splinter group of the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) created in 1978 by more radical elements of the 
MNLF.
66
  They have institutional links to international terrorist organizations such as Al 
Qaeda, Harkat-ul-unsar, and Hezbollah.
67
  MILF is the parent of the Indonesian Islamic 
Liberation Front, also known as Jemaah Islamiyah, providing training and sanctuary to 
them at their inception.
68
  MILF practices a Salafist Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, and 
has successfully created a parallel Islamic government in Mindanao.
69
  It is responsible 
for numerous terrorist attacks of civilian targets within the Philippines.  However, its 
prominence provided clout to openly negotiate a peace treaty in 2001 with the GRP, thus 
preventing the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) and the U.S. military from conducting 
operations targeting it.
70
   
ASG is an Al Qaeda franchise organization whose network structure extends 
beyond the Philippines, through Southeast Asia, and into the Middle East.  Abdurajak 
Janjalani (Abu Sayyaf) founded this group in the early 1990s after fighting in 
Afghanistan as a part of MILF.
71
  Indeed, it was Osama Bin Laden‘s brother-in-law who 
recruited Sayyaf to Al Qaeda and introduced him to Ramzi Yousef, Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammad (KSM), and Wali Kahn Amin Shah.
72
  Al Qaeda has provided funding and 
training to ASG since its inception.
73
  ASG made a name for itself through its hundreds 
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of terrorist acts to include Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) and bombings, primarily 
directed against Westerners and Christians.
74
  In 1995, ASG killed 53 civilians and 
soldiers, and wounded over 100, when they attacked the Christian town of Ipil in 
Mindanao.  When the AFP finally killed Abu Sayyaf in 1998, ASG splintered and grew 
more violent and gangster-like.  Khadaffy Janjalani, Sayyaf‘s brother took leadership of 
the main group of ASG and maintained close ties to Al Qaeda.  ASG continued to 
prosecute high-profile attacks primarily against Westerners.
75
  ―Jeemah Islamiah and Al 
Qaeda cadre began to use MILF bases on Mindanao for training and planning operations, 
which brought JI into direct contact with Abu Sayyaf.‖76  In 2002, Khadaffy called for a 
Muslim offensive against U.S. forces in the Philippines and affiliated ASG with the 
Indonesia-based JI, elevating the organization to follow a higher call of Islamic Jihad.  
ASG was the primary target of U.S–AFP operations during Balikatan 02-1 due to its ties 
with Al Qaeda and their KFR activities targeting Westerners.   
Similarly, JI is an al Qaeda franchise that originated in Indonesia in the early 
1970s and spread throughout Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, as well as 
Australia and Pakistan.
77
  JI founders, Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir and Abdullah Sungkar sought 
to establish Islamic sharia law in Indonesia through political revolution or jihad.
78
  
Ba‘asyir, an Islamic cleric who is often called the Asian Osama Bin Laden, assumed 
leadership of JI after Sungkar died in 1999.
79
  They founded al Mukmin, an Islamic 
boarding school in 1971 that became a recruiting station for JI.
80
  This school was the 
first stop on a jihadi training pipeline passing through Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.  
Fleeing imprisonment by the Indonesian government, Ba‘asyir and Sungkar travelled to 
Malaysia in 1985; they came into contact with other Muslim militants who connected 
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them to the global jihad.  From there, Sungkar travelled to Afghanistan to meet Osama 
Bin Laden, where he secured training and finance for JI.  Ba‘asyir and Sungkar expanded 
JI‘s network across Southeast Asia and Australia, sending operatives to Afghanistan and 
the Philippines for training.
81
  They returned to Indonesia in 1999, following General 
Suharto‘s fall, where a fledgling democracy allowed them to openly recruit and operate.  
JI has conducted or attempted several high profile attacks throughout Southeast Asia.  
Some of these include the Bali nightclub bombing of 2002, which killed over 200 people, 
a series of Indonesian church bombings in 2000, an attempt to bomb several Western and 
American targets in Singapore, and the attempted assassination of Indonesian Vice 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri.
82
  JI partners with MILF splinter groups and ASG as 
trainers/technical advisors.
83
  JI joins ASG as a primary target of OEF-P because of their 
links to Al Qaeda and their high-profile attacks. 
C. COOPERATION 
Cooperation between the U.S. military and the AFP began with Operation 
Balikatan 02-01, which was the inaugural exercise of Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines (OEF-P).  Joint Task Force (JTF) 510, comprised of 1300 U.S. troops—
primarily an air component and support component—had a light tactical footprint of 160 
U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) and 300 Navy Seabees.
84
  JTF-510 conducted combined 
operations with the AFP along three Lines of Operation (LOO), in priority: Building AFP 
capacity, Focused Civil-Military Operations, and Information Operations.  JTF-510, led 
by 1st Special Forces Group(Airborne) Commander, COL David Fridovich, was the 
headquarters assigned to run operations overseeing ARSOF operations during Balikitan 
02-01.  He structured 1st SFG(A) to execute six-month rotations of subordinate elements, 
to establish a persistent partnership with the Philippine security forces.
85
  These 
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combined U.S.-Philippine operations intended to work by, with, and through AFP to 
reinforce the legitimacy of GRP, separate the population from ASG, and then destroy 
ASG on the Southern Philippine Island of Basilan from January to June 2002.
86
 
1. LOO: Building Philippine Armed Force (AFP) Capacity 
First, JTF-510 built AFP capacity and legitimacy in order to create a secure and 
stable environment by defeating ASG and protecting the local population.  Special Forces 
Detachments were partnered with both AFP and Civil Augmentation Force Geographical 
Units (CAFGU), similar to Afghanistan‘s Village Stability Operations (VSO) program.87  
Their mission was to train, advise and assist each of their partners, however, they were 
restricted from actual combat operations.  JTF-510 determined that ARSOTF‘s first 
priority was ―improving the legitimacy of the GRP through the use of the 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) model,‖88 and critical to the success of this goal was putting 
the AFP in the lead of securing the population from intimidation or attack by ASG. 
At the outset of Balikatan 02-1, ―SF advisors were deployed down to the battalion 
level and moved in with their Philippine counterparts in remote areas near insurgent 
strongholds.‖89  The teams worked to assess their partners‘ tactical capabilities.  They 
found AFP equipment in disrepair, and that the AFP lacked adequate security and basic 
infantry skills, and some operational failures were the result of corruption in AFP ranks.
90
  
While little could be done initially regarding AFP equipment, ―base-camp security was 
greatly enhanced after the arrival of the SF teams.‖91  The teams prioritized training that 
established combat skills, improved the confidence of the AFP, and built rapport with 
local villages.   
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Indeed, advisor efforts focused on teaching the AFP all the necessary skills to 
effectively combat ASG, ranging from basic tactical skills to operational planning.  SF 
teams, typically 8–12 SF soldiers, taught the AFP basic infantry skills such as 
marksmanship, patrolling, and combat lifesaving skills.  In addition to on-base training, 
AFP and SF advisors conducted regular patrols that reestablished government security for 
the nearby villages, which were often the target of ASG intimidation or attacks.
92
  SF 
soldiers were eventually permitted to participate in direct combat operations, as advisors 
only, which played a key role in improving the capability of the AFP and gaining their 
trust.
93
  SF advisors also increased the operational planning skills of the AFP through 
intelligence sharing and training in information collection and fusion.  Advisors were 
able to leverage U.S. sources of intelligence and integrate this knowledge to support AFP 
operations against the ASG.  With increased security and greater AFP professionalism, 
villagers ―openly shared information on the local situation with AFP and U.S. forces.‖94   
―Exercise Balikatan 02-1 ended in July 2002, but the presence of Army [SOF] in 
the Philippines did not.‖95  By the conclusion of Balikatan 02-1, AFP units had built 
rapport that established a positive popular image of the GRP.
96
  Additionally, while 
combined SOF-AFP efforts did not completely dismantle ASG, combat operations denied 
ASG safe haven in strategically significant areas.
97
  JTF-510 reorganized into Joint 
Special Operations Task Force—Philippines (JSOTF-P), and continued to develop AFP 
capacity at the operational and tactical levels of war.  U.S. advisors‘ presence decreased 
to one SF B-Detachment and five SF A-Detachments, numbering a total of approximately 
100 advisors.
98
  Organizing as Liaison Coordination Elements (LCE) consisting of 4–12 
U.S. SOF troops, teams deployed to the AFP tactical units ranging from the battalion to 
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the division levels, and continued to advise and assist AFP units in operational planning 
and intelligence fusion.
99
  While Balikatan 02-1 focused advisory efforts on Basilan 
Island, OEF-P extends operational reach across the whole Sulu Archipelago and began 
targeting JI in addition to ASG.  Between 2002 and 2006, AFP operations dealt a 
significant blow to ASG, reducing their armed strength from approximately 1000 to 
about 300.
100
  As recently as February 2009, combined JSOTF-P—ASG efforts have 
pursued ASG/JI across the Archipelago, successfully denying them new sanctuaries.
101
 
However, training the AFP and restoring security to the southern Philippines was 
only a first step toward a successful AFP COIN campaign against ASG/JI.  Increased 
security facilitated concurrent civil-military humanitarian assistance programs.  These 
civil-military operations (CMO) increased the legitimacy of the AFP and GRP, while 
delegitimizing ASG and JI.
102
 
2. LOO: Focused Civil-Military Operations 
Second, JTF-510 facilitated Philippine led humanitarian and civic-action projects 
to improve the quality of life of the average citizen and increase the legitimacy of the 
GRP.  Controlling the relationships between the people, the government, and the 
insurgents is essential in a COIN campaign.
103
  At the outset of Balikatan 02-1, the 
Philippine people were disaffected by the GRP, largely feeling neglected and oppressed.  
ASG often used heavy-handed intimidation tactics to control the population, who had no 
confidence of refuge in the AFP.  In order to restore popular confidence to the AFP and 
the GRP, JTF-510 developed a Philippine led Civil-Military Operations (CMO) plan 
aimed at driving a wedge between ASG and their popular support base. 
JTF-510‘s CMO plan aimed to provide basic services to the population.  The AFP 
and JTF-510 used several tools to restore civil services and restore the trust of the 
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Philippine people.  The first step was to conduct an assessment of the socio-economic 
trends and living conditions on Basilan, in order to determine and prioritize CMO efforts.  
Under SF advisement, the AFP surveyed 60,000 of Basilan‘s 350,000 residents, 
determining that the three areas of greatest need were providing potable water, medical 
care, and improving transportation infrastructure.
104
  No NGOs had worked on Basilan 
since 1999, and ASG had driven teachers and doctors off the island leaving the majority 
Muslim population with insufficient health care and education.
105
  Because of the heavy 
equipment required, the Navy Seabee detachment focused on digging wells and repairing 
transportation infrastructure.  In all, they dug three deep-water wells, improved 80km of 
road and erected four bridges.
106
   
However, the Medical Civil-Action Programs (MEDCAP), and Dental Civil-
Action Programs (DENTCAP) were the most effective tools for winning popular support.  
These programs typically involved regular AFP-SOF patrols to local villages, where SF 
trained AFP medics conducted ―sick-call‖ in order to treat the various maladies of the 
people.  SF medics personally treated medical conditions that required greater care, or 
facilitated transportation to a higher level of medical care.  ―More than 30,000 people had 
received treatment from [SOF-AFP] sponsored MEDCAPs and DENTCAPs.‖107  
Sometimes, the JTF & AFP used MEDCAPs to highlight the brutality of ASG, by 
providing medical assistance in areas of recent ASG attacks or sanctuaries.  The ASG 
recognized the effectiveness of these humanitarian assistance missions and attempted 
further terrorist attacks.  However, because of the MEDCAPS, the people of Basilan 
recognized the benefits of supporting the AFP, and showed their gratitude by providing 
information about ASG locations and attacks.
108
 
Additionally, it was crucial that the population recognize that the AFP led the 
CMO projects.  This leadership was facilitated by a GRP/Pacific Command (PACOM) 
                                                 
104 Cherilyn A. Walley, ―Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island,‖ Special Warfare 17, 
no. 1 (September 2004), 30–33. 
105 Ibid., 31. 
106 Ibid., 35. 
107 Ibid., 34. 
108 Ibid. 
 37 
established force-cap that prevented greater numbers of U.S. Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers 
from participating in Balikatan 02-1.
109
  As a result, JTF-510 used the SF advisor teams 
to guide and resource AFP efforts.  ―Humanitarian and development assistance also has 
enhanced the legitimacy of the AFP and Philippine government at the expense of Aby 
Sayyaf, and provided opportunities for Philippine security forces to engage positively 
with local populations.‖110  In fact, as the AFP regained popular trust, villagers openly 
shared information on the insurgents that enhanced the effectiveness of tactical 
operations.  Further, Philippine professionals who had fled the Basilan, such as doctors 
and teachers, returned to their communities to provide basic humanitarian services to 
their own people because their confidence in the AFP‘s ability was restored.111 
After Balikatan 02-1 ended and JSTOF-P replace JTF-510, CMO efforts 
continued across the entire area of operations. While efforts to provide clean water, 
medical care and transportation infrastructure continued, the CMO mission expanded to 
include building education infrastructure as well.  ―During 2006, the AFP and JSOTF-P 
have built 19 school-construction/renovation projects, dug 10 wells, begun five road 
projects, started work on five community centers and built five water-distribution centers 
on Jolo Island.‖112  The USNS Mercy, a naval hospital ship designed for conducting 
medical assistance missions, has also made repeated trips to the islands.  Each CMO 
project sought to be sustainable by the local population by either employing locals in the 
construction process and/or passing responsibility for maintaining the project to the local 
authorities.
113
  By the end of 2010, ―JSOTF-P reportedly has implemented over 150 
construction projects worth $20 million, created livelihoods for former militants, and 
directly supported related USAID efforts.‖114   
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Furthermore, the impact of these projects extends beyond the local communities 
where they were conducted.  These projects are a core element of the AFP and JSOTF-P 
information operations.  As a result, Philippine communities on other islands heard about 
these projects and sought the assistance of the AFP.  For example, the inhabitants of 
Pangutaran Island in the Sulu Archipelago sought assistance from AFP and JSOTF-P 
after hearing about these CMO projects.  As a result, the inhabitants of Pangutaran 
rapidly notified the AFP when ASG and JI sought refuge on their island.  The AFP 
Marines, and SF advisors, conducted a kinetic operation and expelled the ASG/JI 
elements from the island before they could establish themselves.
115
  It is clear that AFP 
Information Operations enhanced the success of AFP capacity building and CMO 
projects. 
3. LOO: Information Operations 
Third, JTF-510 conducted Information Operations with the GRP and U.S. 
Embassy to emphasize operational successes and build support for the GRP.  This was 
perhaps the most difficult part of Balikitan 02-01.  The Philippine citizens and media are 
very distrustful of any foreign military operating on their soil.  Indeed this is the reason 
why the operation was named Balikitan, meaning shoulder to shoulder, in order to build 
legitimacy of the exercise in the eyes of the public.  Additionally, abuses in the use of 
psychological operations under the Marcos regime from 1972 to 1986, increased 
suspicion of information operations designed to increase the legitimacy of Balikitan 02-
01 and the GRP.
116
  Despite these restrictions and obstacles, JTF-510 was able to achieve 
some tangible gains.  One example is the role that information operations played in the 
AFP rescue of the Gracia and Martin Burnham, and Deborah Yap.  The AFP rescue 
operation executed less than two weeks after Ambassador Ricciardone promoted a JTF-
510 created wanted poster, identifying twelve prominent ASG leaders that were 
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subsequently airdropped over Basilan.  JTF-510 successfully used print, audio and cell 
text messages to contribute to tactical operations and build the legitimacy of the Balikitan 
02-01 exercise. 
JSOTF-P PSYOPs teams have since expanded their efforts to informing the 
populace on the dangers of supporting terrorists in their area.  The teams regularly 
conduct assessments throughout their area of operations, surveying the populace and 
analyzing the cultures in each area.  These surveys allow JSOTF-P to communicate their 
messages more effectively by accounting for cultural sensitivities.  These surveys are 
valuable to Non-Governmental Agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the U.S. Embassy.  One product of these surveys is a 10 part 
graphic novel series that informs the populace of the evils of terrorism.  JSOTF-P 
publishes this series in various forms tailored to the distribution region.  Each publishing 
has real world correlation by using local names, attire, scenery, dialects, and historical 
subtleties to appeal to the targeted community.  Trusted locals review each version prior 
to production to ensure that the novel resonates with the people.
117
  This product and 
others have positively shaped the perception of U.S. forces, the AFP, while degrading 
support for the ASG. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Since Balikitan 02-01, Joint Special Operations Task Force—Philippines (JSOTF-
P) continued the operational successes of TF-510.  Their actions are best described in the 
moniker of ―Thinking COIN, Practicing FID.‖118  The U.S. Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID) mission is to support AFP‘s COIN efforts, rather than conduct COIN themselves.  
The aforementioned GRP imposed restrictions on direct U.S. military action forces an 
indirect approach characterized by working through the AFP in order to accomplish the 
shared goal of defeating ASG and JI terrorists.  Indeed, this restriction on numbers of 
U.S. troops and prohibitions from conducting combat operations distinguishes OEF-P 
from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.  Initial U.S. military proposals 
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in 2001 mimicked OEF by proposing, ―large, direct, and assertive role for U.S. forces: a 
direct combat role for U.S. military personnel.‖119 Philippine imposed political 
restrictions dictated an indirect role for U.S. forces that led, somewhat paradoxically, to 
success with low cost in political, financial, and troop costs.  As OEF-P enters its 9th 
year, the AFP is a dramatically more professional force, and the ASG and JI have been 
forced to withdraw from many of their safe havens. 
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V. EL SALVADOR AND CENTRAL AMERICA 
For much of the 1980s, the United States conducted a foreign internal defense 
campaign to assist the government of El Salvador in defeating the communist Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgency.  This campaign involved multiple 
lines of operation across several countries.  Despite extraordinarily small numbers of 
forces committed to this campaign, the United States was able to prevent the communist 
overthrow of the pro-American government.  Additionally, these advisors successfully 
modernized the El Salvadorian military and changed their perceptions and operations, 
thus resulting in fewer human rights abuses and unjust repression of the population.  This 
effort, mainly undertaken by SOF, with supporting conventional military and other 
governmental efforts successfully stopped the spread of communism in the region, and 
rolled back the previous progress by communist guerilla organizations.  This success was 
the result of a campaign of persistent presence across the region by U.S. advisors, making 
incremental gains in terms of shaping their partner forces to achieve shared goals. 
A. SEEDS OF CIVIL WAR AND COMMUNIST PLANS 
While El Salvador may have been the main effort for both communist and 
American backed efforts, the successful communist revolution in Nicaragua provided the 
catalyst that sparked this decade long campaign.  By the 1970s, the Somoza family‘s 
kleptocracy had ruled Nicaragua for 40 years, at that point lead by Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle.  Years of poverty in the face of Somoza fraud had created conditions somewhat 
amenable for the communist Sandinistas (the FSLN) among the people.  Perhaps the most 
egregious example involved stealing mass amounts of international aid after a massive 
1972 earthquake.
120
  However, anti-government forces gained popular favor in 1974 after 
kidnappings by the FSLN resulted in a massive and over reactive crackdown that 
captured, killed, or tortured not only communist guerillas, but also large numbers of 
peasant farmers caught up in the dragnet.
121
  This harsh repression by the Somoza 
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government, and the widespread reporting of it in the United States, did not sit well with 
newly inaugurated President Carter in 1977.  Despite Somoza‘s attempts to ease the 
violent repression and ease concerns of his American patrons, the United States decided 
to withdraw aid to Nicaragua.  Ironically, this withdrawal of support did not improve the 
Nicaraguan government‘s human rights record; in fact, violations increased towards the 
end of the Somoza regime in 1979
122
.  This U.S. policy did, however, leave the 
Nicaraguan military without external support at a time when the FSLN was receiving 
support from Cuba, Panama, and Costa Rica.  Inevitably, the Somoza government fell 
and the Sandinistas came to power. 
The Soviet Union and Cuba saw this as an outstanding opportunity.  This was the 
first successful expansion of communism into Latin America since the Cuban Revolution.  
Moreover, it presented the communists with a base from which to back communist rebels 
in other Central American countries.  The Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua developed 
a multinational plan for the spread of communism in Central America with a four 
cooperative plans in four separate countries.  First, the communists sought to emplace a 
communist government in El Salvador through a FMLN insurgent campaign.  These 
insurgents would be supplied and assisted from bases of support in Nicaragua.  
Additionally, Nicaragua and the Cubans would back six separate communist 
organizations in Honduras in order to cause disruption and make it less likely that the 
Honduran military would intervene in El Salvador.  Finally, the communists sought to 
end American support for El Salvador through a robust information operations 
campaign.
123
  In fact, the FMLN with their Nicaraguan sponsors set a target date for 
successful revolution of January 1981.  This date was not arbitrary; it was selected to 
precede Ronald Reagan‘s inauguration, after which it was assumed American support for 
the Salvadorian government against the communists would increase.
124
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By the 1970s, Salvadorian society had developed a wide rift between the poor 
campesinos and the privileged ruling class.  This system, in place for over 50 years, had 
reached a critical point as leftist political agitators stoked dissatisfaction among the lower 
class, while the Catholic Church brought legitimate human rights complaints to the 
forefront.
125
  These factors set the conditions for El Salvador‘s descent into civil war 
starting on October 15, 1979 when a junta, concerned with protecting the old power base, 
overthrew the government of General Romero. 
The U.S. developed a region wide campaign plan to defeat the FMLN in El 
Salvador, disrupt the Sandinistas ability to support the FMLN, and disrupt the 
communists‘ attempts to affect the Hondurans. 
B. THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT 
El Salvador presented an incredibly difficult problem for the United States.  First, 
America was about 5 years removed from Vietnam, and the memory of military 
involvement in a messy anti-communist bush war was fresh in the American psyche.  
Neither America‘s public nor politicians had the will for another protracted conflict that 
would require large scale deployments.  Second, the Salvadorian forces offered a less 
than ideal partner for the United States.  By 1981, the government was in its third 
unelected military junta and appeared illegitimate in the eyes of the Salvadorian people 
and the international community.
126
  The Salvadorian Armed Forces (ESAF) were 
unprepared for the conflict, numbering a paltry 15,000 troops (compared to 7,000–12,000 
FMLN) in 1980,
127
 and ESAF leadership was mired in a promotion system which was 
designed to protect the old order, failed to punish corruption or inefficiency and stifled 
innovation.
128
  Perhaps most troubling, the ESAF leadership fundamentally 
misunderstood the nature of defeating the FMLN and winning the people‘s trust.  The 
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ESAF, feeling that strong-armed repression was their only effective tool, backed official 
and semi-official ―death squads‖ who dealt harshly with both guerillas and their 
sympathizers alike.  This heavy handed campaign reached its low point in 1980 with two 
high profile incidents which brought international condemnation upon the Salvadorian 
government: the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero during mass, and the 
abduction, rape and murder of four American nuns.
129
 
It would seem the deck had already been stacked against any American effort to 
prevent communist success.  By the time President Reagan came to office, the FMLN 
―final offensive‖ had failed, but had mobilized the leftist guerillas into the ―war of 
movement‖ phase, and allowed them to take de facto control over large portions of the 
country.  Additionally, a well-established supply line from Nicaragua was funneling 
weapons from across the communist world into FMLN hands, many of them being 
American weapons captured by the Vietnamese.
130
 
―Our most urgent objective is to stop the large flow of arms through Nicaragua 
into El Salvador…,‖ wrote President Reagan in a 1981 State Department bulletin, ―(w)e 
consider what is happening is part of the global Communist campaign coordinated by 
Havana and Moscow.‖131  Despite resolve on the part of the administration, the prospect 
of U.S. involvement in El Salvador was low.  By 1980, the U.S. media had drawn 
allusions between proposed involvement in Central America to Vietnam.
132
  American 
public polling showed that only 2 percent favored U.S. intervention, and 80 percent were 
opposed to even sending advisors.
133
  Against this backdrop, the Administration and 
congress reached a compromise; the number of advisors allowed in country would be 
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strictly limited to 55 at any given time.
134
  Further, these advisors were strictly forbidden 
from participating in combat operations; they could only assist in training and advising. 
C. SOF ADVISORS 
Ironically, this limit proved to be one of the keys to success in El Salvador.  As 
COL James Steele—Military Advisor Group (MILGRP) commander from 1984–1986—
pointed out,  
Nobody … cursed the 55-man limit more than I… but I just have to tell 
you that doing it with a low U.S. profile is the only way to go. If you 
don‘t, you immediately get yourself into trouble, because there is a 
tendency for Americans to want to do things quickly, to do them 
efficiently – and the third step in that process is to do it yourself. If you 
take that third step here, you have lost the battle.
135
 
In March of 1981, the first 55-man package arrived in country and task organized 
themselves into several functional units to maximize the effect of this relatively small 
group of Americans.  First, the advisors established the MILGRP headquarters—with 
overall responsibility for the United States efforts to combat the FMLN, and support 
requirements such as helicopter maintenance.  Second, the advisors created small unit 
training teams which trained ESAF units as embedded advisors.  Third, they created 
Operational Planning and Assistance Teams (OPATs), which advised ESAF units in 
more complex environments—ones in which interaction with the local population was 
critical.  Finally, they created Mobile Training Teams that trained various ESAF units on 
specific specialized tasks.
136
  After filling these requirements, the advisers averaged one 
Special Forces advisor per ESAF battalion. 
In order to better combat the FMLN, several changes had to be made in ESAF 
operations.  First, the advisors convinced the battalions to leave their fixed compounds, 
which had been targets for FMLN attacks, and patrol the country.  The point of this was 
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twofold: to engage the population in order to rebuild the faith of the people in the ESAF, 
and to deny the guerillas safe haven and freedom of movement within the country.  
Second, because of the limited number of advisors, they would often have to adopt a 
―train the trainer‖ model for instruction, which placed a higher burden on the Salvadorian 
non-commissioned officers and junior officers.  This was key in a society with no 
tradition of strong NCOs and in which competence and innovation among officers was 
not viewed as necessary for success.
137
  Third, the advisors made structural changes to the 
units they advised.  At times when more precision than their battalion could provide was 
required, these advisors would often recruit from within the battalion a smaller, elite unit 
of volunteers.
138
  This operational progress, along with growing support for the ESAF 
among the population, created an environment in which FMLN guerillas did not have the 
freedom of movement they did in 1981 nor could they prevent the ESAF from operating 
anywhere throughout the country.  According to COL John Ellerson, the MILGRP 
commander from 1986–1988, 
The people that we capture tell us that 24-36 hours tops, and they've got to 
be moving. Increasingly in the core areas of the country it's the terrorists 
that you kill. Their equipment is not in that good shape. Their uniform is 
not that good. He doesn't look like he has been living a very good life. So 
again, the picture I want to create is there are 56,000 out and about and 
going anywhere they want. There is no place in this country now that the 
ESAF doesn't go, can't go, in those smaller operating units
139
.  
By 1986, massive attrition among the FMLN and this inability to train what forces 




Perhaps the greatest accomplishments the advisors had were those they developed 
over the course of several years.  ―One of the principal missions of our military trainers is 
to… reduc(e) the abuses suffered in the past by the civilian population at the hands of the 
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armed forces.‖141  This gradual change did not occur because the advisors insisted on 
immediate changes; rather they habitually talked about the practical reasons for respect 
for human rights.  They highlighted the importance of the relationship between the people 
and the military in a counterinsurgent campaign, as well as the importance of taking 
prisoners for intelligence reasons, gradually reduced the number of human right abuses.  
On occasion, when these practical arguments didn‘t work, the advisors pointed out that 
claims of abuses would lead to withdrawal of U.S. support.
142
  Diminishing the exposure 
of these abuses had key strategic significance as the KGB had begun a propaganda 
campaign, targeting American peace organizations, to advertise abuses of the United 
States backed government in the hopes of disrupting U.S. support for the 
counterinsurgents.
143
  In the end, U.S. efforts had a demonstrable effect in the decline of 
―death squad‖ murders, from 610 per month in 1980 to 23 a month in 1987.144 
Thus, despite the bleak picture at the outset of American involvement, a relatively 
small number of advisers were able to shape their partner force and bring the conflict to 
acceptable conclusion.  Prior to the American advisors the FMLN had almost achieved 
manpower and firepower parity with the ESAF, ESAF affiliated crimes turned both the 
population and American public opinion against them, and the ESAF had neither 
tradition of strong junior leaders nor the drive to seek out the enemy.  Despite all of this, 
the American advisors reformed the ESAF by training and empowering NCOs, thus built 
long term capacity in their partner force, assisted in planning operations that both built 
rapport with the local population and denied the enemy safe haven, and changed the 
ESAF‘s human rights record. 
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D. SUPPORTING EFFORTS/ REGIONAL TIES 
Honduras became involved as a regional player in the war in El Salvador for two 
reasons.  First, the communists sought to prevent the possibility of Honduran intervention 
into El Salvador.  If the Honduran military were occupied with their own domestic 
insurgents, they would be less likely to intervene in the civil war in El Salvador.
145
  
Second, the MILGRP started sending key Salvadorian personnel to the newly created 
Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) in Honduras in order to train more of the 
ESAF without violating the 55 advisor limit.
146
  In addition to assisting in training 3,500 
Salvadorian soldiers,
147
 this facility was key in developing Honduran capacity to defeat 
their own communists, and was indicative of the total regional approach taken and 
required by the United States to combat the Communist strategy.  Unfortunately, a lack of 
diplomatic effort failed to maintain this relationship and by 1985 Honduras closed the 
RMTC to Salvadorian training because of preexisting animosity.
148
  
Additionally, the United States sought to expand the regional campaign by 
conducting Unconventional Warfare (UW) against the Sandinista regime by backing the 
Contra rebels, which started in November 1981
149
 and continued until the news of the 
Iran-Contra scandal in 1986.  The Reagan administration at different times publicly 
presented different objectives for this UW campaign—either overthrow of the Sandinista 
regime
150
 or disrupting Sandinista ability to back the FMLN.
151
  However, it does not 
appear that the UW campaign was able to achieve either effect.  The Sandinista regime 
was eventually defeated in open elections in 1990, and there was little demonstrated 
decline in the amount of material support provided to the FMLN by the Sandinistas.
152
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This may be due to an ill-defined American goal for the Contras and that the UW effort—
mainly run by the Central Intelligence Agency—was never properly synchronized with 
the SOF and conventional military efforts in El Salvador and Honduras.  Had the Contras 
been specifically designated a supporting effort to the FID mission in El Salvador, their 
attacks could have been better directed against Nicaraguan ability to export revolution 
and, thus, had measurable effects. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 The campaign in Central America was successful because the United States 
addressed multiple efforts undertaken by communist forces in the region.  The guerilla 
campaign to overthrow the government of El Salvador was matched by the COIN efforts 
of the MILGRP and ESAF.  The smaller guerilla effort to fix the Hondurans was matched 
by a COIN effort, and the Nicaraguans efforts to supply and support the two were 
countered by the infamous Contra campaign.  However, this would probably have proven 
more effective had the goal been to disrupt Nicaraguan support rather than regime 
change.  We can see from the closure of the RMTC that a lack of military and diplomatic 
effort throughout a region can lead to a mismatch in priorities.  An interagency type task 
force established to synchronize U.S. efforts throughout the region would probably have 
proven more effective. 
 However, what probably made El Salvador most successful was persistence.  For 
the better part of a decade, U.S. advisors maintained a constant presence in the country 
working towards the eventual goal of the defeat of the FMLN.  Rather than seeking large 
gains early on, the advisors worked diligently to create step by step lasting gains, both in 
terms of effects on friendly and enemy forces. 
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VI.  FINDINGS 
The previous two case studies are examples of limited numbers of U.S. SOF 
conducting operations in politically sensitive environments in order to promote the 
strategic interests of the United States.  In OEF-P, SOF operating by and through the 
Philippine Armed Forces over a 9-year period were able to make dramatic gains in 
defeating the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah in the Philippines.  In the El 
Salvador Case study, small numbers of SOF advisors were able to shape the military of 
El Salvador assisted by other efforts in Honduras and Nicaragua to combat growing 
Communist influence in the region.  The two primary lessons of these case studies are 
that SOF is most effective when they are persistent and regionally integrated. 
A. PERSISTENCE 
Strategic utilization of SOF is more effective when used persistently.  For the U.S. 
military to pursue strategic interests regarding security improvements in troubled spots 
around the world requires increases in both influence over FPF and intelligence on U.S. 
adversaries.  Increasing both influence and intelligence requires greater trust, which can 
only be gained with persistent presence or engagement.153  These case studies 
demonstrate that persistence adds value to SOF‘s ability to build capacity of FPF, 
contributes to Intelligence synergy, can shape future conflicts, and enable other 
Interagency and conventional military assets.   
Persistence requires the frequent and sustained interaction between SOF and FPF.  
In OEF-P, a small SOF element has constantly engaged the AFP since 2002, rotating 
advisors on a semiannual basis.  In El Salvador, 55 troops advised Salvadorian military 
from 1981 to 1989, rotating on an annual basis.  In each case, SOF advisors were in direct 
contact with FPF, living in the same small unit compounds, working together on a daily 
basis.  This level of interaction promoted U.S. interests in a sustainable and enduring 
way. 
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First, SOF effectively increased the security capability of the AFP and 
Salvadorian military through increased influence based on greater trust borne out of 
persistent presence.  Progressive capacity building requires consistency and continuity to 
be effective.  Trainers and advisors must either keep excellent records on the progress 
and capabilities of a unit that can easily be passed to the next set of trainers/advisors, or 
they must have prolonged interaction to facilitate continued improvement.  Prior to 
Balikatan 02-1, the AFP was generally viewed as unprofessional, oppressive, and unable 
to protect the local population from ASG.  Similarly, the Salvadorians viewed their 
military as lackeys for the ruling elite who brutalized the population.  They lacked 
professionalism, tactical skill, and the credibility necessary to effectively combat a 
communist counterinsurgency.  Additionally, these forces had neither the operational 
capability nor the will to venture out from their compounds to defeat the FMLN.  
However, SOF advisors affected remarkable improvements in both of these security 
organizations over the course of years through constant training and interaction.  The 
AFP gained the professionalism and tactical skills to protect the population, which led to 
greater support for the government and less for the ASG/JI.  Similarly, the Salvadorian 
military improved their operational skills, but more significantly operated with greater 
professionalism that restored popular trust in their military.  Persistent SOF engagement 
increased the capability and professionalism of these security forces that had fomented 
support for the insurgents/terrorists to that point. 
Second, SOF increased the security within the Philippines and El Salvador by 
synthesizing intelligence with FPF after establishing trust through constant engagement.  
Intelligence sharing is impossible without trust between organizations, and building 
relationships of trust takes time.  As these relationships grew, a greater comfort level 
developed between these forces that led to greater intelligence synergy.  In the 
Philippines, U.S. SOF and the AFP increasingly shared information with each other and 
integrated their intelligence assets, which led to greater success against the ASG/JI.  In El 
Salvador, the military‘s habitual heavy-handedness prevented U.S. military, intelligence, 
and diplomatic elements from sharing information lest it be used to brutalize the 
population.  As the Salvadorian military‘s conduct changed and they earned the trust of 
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the population, greater intelligence brought similar increases in the effectiveness of COIN 
operations.  Partner Forces‘ enhanced ability to gain information from the population can 
be fused with American technical means to provide a more complete analysis of events in 
the country.  In each case, persistence was essential for the growth of trust that enables 
intelligence cooperation and operational effectiveness. 
Third, SOF enabled other Interagency (IA) and conventional military assets 
because of persistence.  The U.S. often uses several elements of national power to 
promote U.S. interests.  To be effective, these elements must be integrated and focused.  
Effective coordination and focus of these assets requires grassroots information about the 
needs of the population, the state of the military, the status of the enemy, among other 
factors.  Persistent presence in country allows advisors to gain a better understanding of 
what situations may be effectively remedied by the involvement of other government 
assets or NGOs.  Additionally, the assessments of these efforts after implementation by 
the advisors lead to better execution. 
At the beginning of U.S. efforts in both the Philippines and El Salvador, 
information on the state of the population and the insurgency was lacking.  As of 2009, 
USAID and CMO programs aimed at improving the quality of life of the Philippine 
population are largely credited as the most significant reason for popular support of the 
Philippine government and military.154  The SOF/GRP civil affairs assessment of 60,000 
people on Basilan was the first survey of the population that had been done in over a 
decade by either governmental or non-governmental agencies.155  The information 
gleaned from this survey enhanced GRP, USAID, and CMO efforts on the island because 
those efforts were able to effectively target the needs and grievances of the population.  
These assessments also facilitated Information Operations (IO) messaging refinement 
that promoted the credibility and legitimacy of the government beyond those who directly 
benefited from CMO assistance.  Additionally, the introduction of the USNS Mercy to 
support JSOTF-P efforts demonstrates the ability for these advisors to leverage 
conventional military assets.  In El Salvador, consistent work with the military led to 
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professionalization and positive contact with the Salvadorian population and thus greater 
knowledge of the population‘s grievances.  In the Philippines, SOF persistent 
engagement facilitated the USAID Growth with Equity program in Mindanao, as well as 
other NGO projects.156  SOF‘s ability to enable GRP and other Interagency and NGO 
efforts should not be underestimated, as they often have greater freedom of movement 
than State Department personnel to move throughout partner countries that have security 
challenges, such as the Philippines, El Salvador, Yemen, Lebanon, etc. 
In both cases, the FPF militaries had equipment in disrepair and an opportunity to 
receive Foreign Military Sales (FMS) from the United States.  The FMS program is a tool 
that U.S. uses to build the capacity of FPF to be more effective military forces.  President 
Bush agreed to supply $100 million in military assistance and $4.6 billion in economic 
aid to the Philippines in 2002.157  Between 1980 and 1989, the United States provided 
$3.5 billion in military aid to El Salvador.158  From 2006 to 2010, the United States 
provided $82.8 million in military assistance to the Philippines primarily to support 
counterterrorism efforts targeting ASG and JI.159  Common concerns related to providing 
millions of dollars of U.S. military assistance to partner nations include effectiveness, 
sustainability, timeliness of the program, and whether the equipment will be used to 
promote shared interests.160  Addressing these concerns requires stronger joint strategic 
planning and coordination between Department of State and Defense at the regional 
level.161  Persistent SOF engagement is uniquely suited to this task as they routinely work 
with the Country Team as well as reporting to their military headquarters when training 
with a FPF.  However, SOF can provide realistic assessments of the equipment purchased 
as well as recommendations for future purchases.  In El Salvador, SOF advisors were also 
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able to identify promising military leaders as candidates for the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) program, where the U.S. military educates these officers 
in its Professional development Schools, such as staff colleges and War Colleges.  Thus 
SOF elements provided an information and feedback conduit for these programs that, 
without SOF information, might have had limited returns. 
Additionally, these cases demonstrate the potential effect that persistence can 
have on shaping the behavior of questionable allies. Concerns over government abuse 
caused the United States to withdraw support from the Samoza regime in Nicaragua that 
precipitated the communist victory.  However, similar concerns over ESAF human rights 
abuses did not lead to withdrawal of support, rather it resulted in support that transformed 
the ESAF, both in terms of effectiveness against the FMLN and human rights.  While 
there is no proof for a counterfactual, one could argue that this type of support for the 
Samoza government may have prevented far more suffering and conflict in the long run, 
and may have resulted in necessary reforms within the Samosa government. 
In summary, SOF utility grew with their engagement persistence.  SOF was able 
to achieve these gains in capacity building, intelligence synergy, and enabling other IA 
assets because they constantly engaged with their FPF and the local population.  
Therefore, SOF was able to promote U.S. Strategic interests because their engagement 
was persistent. 
B. REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Effective SOF utilization requires regional integration in order to have a strategic 
impact.  These case studies demonstrate that when facing a regionally oriented threat, 
SOF must organize in a regional manner.  State sovereignty often complicates, and 
possibly prohibits, the U.S. military from operating in politically sensitive areas.  The 
Communists understood this in the 1980s as terrorist organizations do today.  U.S. forces 
must be able to deny sanctuaries and support across an entire region in order to defeat 
extremist threats with regional ties.  While U.S. forces could operate across the Philippine 
islands, ASG/JI had reach beyond the Philippine which facilitates their continued 
survival.  While the U.S. efforts in Central America were dedicated to defeating 
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communists in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, these efforts were not efficiently 
coordinated in an overarching regional plan.  SOF utility was diminished because they 
were not used in a regionally integrated manner. 
First, enemies of the United States will continue to operate in a regional manner.  
When considering operations less than traditional warfare, the enemies are often 
insurgent or terrorist organizations.  These organizations by nature are non-state actors 
who can move easily across geographic boundaries.  Conversely, U.S. forces generally 
respects the sovereignty of states, and as such cannot move across these porous 
boundaries the way the enemy can.  These restrictions offer the enemy bases of support, 
operation, and sanctuary across a region when political sensitivities preclude 
conventional U.S. forces intervention, and if that state is either unwilling or unable to 
combat these enemies.  ASG/JI are able to escape and fight another day because OEF-P 
does not have elements outside of the Philippines.  Indeed, the government of Singapore 
recognized this in 2002 and attempted to mobilize their neighbors against the growing al 
Qaeda threat.162  They were unable to affect cooperation at that time, however, the 
United States is a much more influential country than Singapore.  The U.S. can 
incentivize S.E. Asian countries to partner with U.S. SOF for a cooperative effort against 
extremist threats.  Indeed, the Philippine partnership was initiated this way when the 
United States offered the GRP assistance after American citizens were taken as hostages 
and executed by ASG.  Similarly, El Salvador and Honduras were incentivized to accept 
U.S. advisors for combating Communist insurgents.   
However, while SOF utility increases when they are employed across a region, a 
regionally integrated plan requires an empowered regional headquarters.  The El 
Salvador-Nicaragua-Honduras case illustrates the importance of an empowered 
headquarters to unite military and non-military efforts across a region.  Military advising 
and training efforts in El Salvador and Honduras were independently productive; 
paramilitary efforts in Nicaragua were also independently productive.  However, these 
efforts supported each other mostly from coincidence rather than design.   
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Another factor to consider is authorities for a regional effort.  During Balikatan 
02-1, JTF-510 was initially restricted from conducting combat operations with their FPF 
because they were only allowed to train and advise rather than assist.  This was an issue 
during the rescue attempt of the Burnhams.  While embedded presence by JSOTF-P 
facilitated action by FPF to rescue American citizens, different authorities would have 
allowed SOF advisors to conduct the operation jointly with the AFP and perhaps could 
have resulted in complete, rather than partial, success. 
SOF has the ability to achieve strategic effects during engagements especially in 
environments less than traditional war.  These forces are uniquely suited to achieve 
effects greater than the size of U.S. commitment.  Persistence and regional integration, 
when combined with the capabilities and competencies of SOF, have an enhancing effect 
that build over time, paying greater dividends than the commitment of SOF in a sporadic 
and unsynchronized manner.  The next chapter will explore how these concepts can be 
operationalized in the current Middle Eastern environment in order to maximize the 
effectiveness of Theater SOF. 
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VII.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current environment in the Middle East requires the United States to re-
position its Special Operations Forces to more effectively achieve American goals.  This 
reallocation should, to the best extent possible, maximize information flow that provides 
a clear picture of emerging crises, thus equipping decision makers with a broad range of 
options for early crisis resolution.  Additionally, these forces should be part of framework 
of persistence and regional engagement as illustrated in the preceding case studies.  
Specifically, regional engagement is required to counter nefarious networks spanning the 
Middle East whether they are non-state transnational terror organizations (e.g., Al Qaeda) 
or state sponsored (e.g., Iranian proxies) organizations. 
A. LINES OF OPERATION 
SOF operators in the Middle East would operate along four Lines of Operation in 
order to advance America‘s interests.  These LOOs are Build Partner Capacity and 
Capability, Build Networks of Influence, Leverage and Support Interagency, and Enable 
Scalable Kinetic Actions.  First, these operators would build partner capacity and 
capability to enable partner nations to more effectively combat threats to both Host 
Nation and American interests.  Ideally, U.S. SOF and FPF train together on an 
uninterrupted basis, so that training is progressive and consistent.  Furthermore, this 
schedule would increase the interoperability of these units, which increases the 
effectiveness of combined operations should a crisis occur.  This LOO also serves as the 
vehicle to build trust between U.S. SOF and FPF that enables building Networks of 
Influence. 
Second, the operators would build Networks of Influence (NOI) in the region to 
increase operational intelligence and influence among partner states.  These networks 
would facilitate atmospheric and cultural knowledge regarding the Host Nation in order 
to better develop a picture of the regional situation.  This information should be collected 
and refined to provide the SOCCENT Commander with quality analysis of the regional 
threat environment.  Moreover, these operator teams could serve as a vehicle for 
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information sharing with FPFs.  Additionally, these networks would aim to shape the 
perceptions, choices, and utilization of FPF.  As was demonstrated in the El Salvador 
case study, constant interaction with FPF can help shape the ways by which they deal 
with non-combatants and other non-hostile actors.  This shift in ―ways‖ is valuable in 
countries where past FPF actions have strained or endangered the Host Nation‘s 
relationship with the United States, neighboring countries, and their own citizens (e.g., 
Lebanon163 and Bahrain164).  Instead of pushing these partners away because of their 
poor human rights record, SOF NOI provides an alternate technique to pursue reform.  
Furthermore, in order to most effectively counter transnational threats in this 
environment, such as al Qaeda or Iranian influence, the United States must foster a 
relationship of trust through persistence between partner nations and U.S. SOF, as well as 
among several partner nations where the United States acts as the honest broker.  This 
security network will facilitate information sharing and interoperability that removes 
geographic border that transnational threats often use for sanctuary, thus increasing the 
aggregate security of the Middle East and ultimately the United States. 
Third, the SOF elements within each country would leverage and support other 
U.S. agencies to assist whole of government approaches to non-security challenges to the 
Host Nation.  Included under this LOO are SOF efforts to provide Humanitarian 
Assistance, facilitate USAID access to indigenous peoples in rural areas of the Host 
Nation, enable counter-drug operations, and promote Human Rights.  Current SOF TSCP 
operations act under the authority of the U.S. country team, as a diplomatic tool that 
increases cooperation with the partner nation.  These efforts can be expanded, while 
remaining under the supervision of the country team, in order to have a multiplying effect 
on whole of government approaches.  As was illustrated in the Philippine case study, 
atmospherics collected by these elements could provide better information for all U.S. 
agencies (e.g., potential projects for USAID and Non-Governmental Organizations).   
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Finally, the SOCCENT Commander would have at his disposal elements 
available to execute a range of scalable options in order to deal with emerging threats.  
These options range from influence to coercion throughout operational environments 
ranging from engagement to war.  These options begin, at the low end, with influencing 
and assisting FPF with mission development and planning.  The next step up would 
involve U.S. SOF advising and supporting FPF during missions, or U.S. SOF led 
combined operations.  Under extreme cases, U.S. SOF could act unilaterally or provide 
intelligence and preparation crucial for National SOF actions.  The last option is SOF‘s 
ability to prepare for the introduction of GPF for an imminent major conflict.  Figure 1 
below demonstrates the scalable options provided by persistently embedded SOF. 
 
Figure 1.   Scalable Options 
This concept, if adopted, will allow the United States to accomplish the four goals 
established in the NSS, NDS and NMS as well as developing a sensory network 
throughout the region that will provide decision makers with a realistic assessment of 
events throughout the Middle East.  Moreover, this solution would minimize or ideally 
not inflame local sensitivities to American military presence, nor would it likely be 
politically or fiscally unacceptable to the American public.  In the event of threats to 
American and Allied interests, America could work by, with, and through partner forces 
thus reduce the need to employ U.S. forces and, if the crisis proves to require 
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conventional American military might, the forward positioned SOF would be able to 
prepare the environment for the introduction of those conventional forces. 
While progress in each of these LOOs is desirable throughout the Middle East, 
each country in the region presents its own inherent challenges, threats, opportunities and 
concerns with neighboring nations.  Further, the interconnected relationships of many of 
these countries and threats mean that achievements or setbacks in one country will have 
residual effects in neighboring states.  Therefore, SOF advisors must take specific 
circumstances of each country, as well as wider regional concerns, into consideration. 
B. REGIONAL ASSESSMENT 
1. The Levant 
The greatest enduring security challenge in the Levant revolves around security 
for Israel and the threats posed to it by Hezbollah and Hamas.  This issue shapes the 
security decisions of all states that border Israel, and compels Israel to maintain a hard 
line stance against any threat, regardless of size.  As such, Hamas and Hezbollah act as 
spoilers of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.  These organizations regularly receive 
financial and material support from external sponsors such as Iran or entities within Saudi 
Arabia.  Syria often acts as a channel for this support as well as a direct belligerent in 
some cases.  Therefore, the U.S. security goals for the Levant should focus on supporting 
the Israeli-Palestinian Peace process though efforts to stabilize the area by pre-empting 
security threats to Israel. 
Close partnership with Egypt should be a cornerstone of any effort to stabilize the 
Levant and set the conditions for an enduring two state solution to the Israel-Palestinian 
problem.  U.S. partnership with former President Hosni Mubarak reflected the belief that 
Egypt is a key state that largely influences the stability of the Levant.  While recent 
upheaval during the Arab Spring deposed the Mubarak regime, it doesn‘t diminish the 
important role that Egypt plays.  In fact, partnership with the Egyptian military is more 
important now than prior to the Arab Spring.  The military is perhaps the only stabilizing 
influence in the country right now, shaping the outcome of the regime change while 
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maintaining security.165  They‘ve been able to do this because the people largely view the 
military as an honest broker, but they have not always enjoyed that level of popular 
support.  There is an opportunity for SOF to build on the Egyptian military‘s current 
status toward greater professionalization that supports current trends toward social and 
economic reform, and to further leverage this relationship to monitor and shape the 
transformation of the new Egypt.  Other regimes are already attempting to use this 
transformation to their advantage as Iran sent two war ships through the Suez Canal only 
days after Mubarak‘s fall.166  Additionally, Iranian agents have recently been expelled 
from Egypt, demonstrating that Iran seeks to influence or support threats to Israel from 
Egypt and that Egypt opposes Iranian influence within its borders.167  U.S. SOF should 
persistently train with Egyptian Army, Air Force, and Navy units with a priority on those 
units that have responsibility for Eastern Egypt/Sinai/Gaza strip area.  This is key with 
Egypt‘s recent opening of the Gaza crossing, potentially giving Hamas greater influence 
and freedom of movement.  Previous relationships between American and Egyptian 
militaries suggest that Egypt would accept this partnership; however, if they do not the 
aid that President Obama and the G8 recently promised to support Egypt could be used as 
leverage.168  This aid should be conditional on military cooperation between Egyptian 
and U.S. forces.  This provides an opportunity to build greater partnership between Egypt 
and the United States as well as monitor the Egyptian security forces level of support for 
Human Rights, while decreasing Israel‘s suspicions of a Southern threat. 
Lebanon is the second leg of the security and stability tripod that supports Israeli-
Palestinian peace.  Hezbollah is a key hindrance to this peace for two reasons.  First, 
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Hezbollah has a great deal of military capacity and capability, which they demonstrated 
in 2006 by militarily and politically humiliating Israel.169  Second, Hezbollah capitalized 
on that victory by securing popular support and seizing significant legitimate 
representation in the Lebanese government.170  Therefore, there is less political support 
for military partnership between the United States and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 
than Egypt.  This was also true in America when Congressman Berman caused a freeze 
on military aid to Lebanon after a rogue Lebanese soldiers/sniper killed an Israeli security 
guard in 2010.171  However, military partnership is possible on a small scale that can 
encourage stability and professionalization of the LAF as a whole.  Investment in 
Lebanon is a long-term endeavor because the United States shunned cooperation with 
Lebanon for over 20 years, and as such created an influence vacuum that Iran and 
Hezbollah were happy to fill.  The U.S. should not make this mistake again, and should 
seek to partner with LAF elite forces, such as the Lebanese Rangers, Strike Force, and 
Marine Commandos.  These elements offer the best hope of countering Hezbollah‘s 
influence and encouraging the professionalization of the LAF.  These units also provide 
domestic security against terrorist elements such as Fatah al-Islam, and may be able to 
decrease nefarious threats to Israel‘s Northern border.172  
U.S. SOF partnership with Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) should be the third 
leg of Israeli-Palestinian security and stability tripod.  The U.S. started a low visibility 
security partnership with PSF in March 2005, in order to supplant Israel‘s need to police 
Palestinian areas.173  This element intends to eliminate terrorist threats to Israel while 
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providing basic security to Palestinians.174  Therefore, successful partnership may 
provide Israel an opportunity for security coordination, with U.S. SOF as a guarantor of 
security while simultaneously affording the Palestinian Authority the means to deter 
violent elements that undercut peace overtures.  While direct partnership with Israel is 
highly sensitive and a source of conflict between U.S. SOF and Arab allies, coordination 
should occur in order to provide this security assurance to Israel that prevents or 
decreases their direct intervention in Palestinian areas.  Furthermore, Israel technically 
falls outside of the CENTCOM AOR and while any U.S. SOF that do partner with them 
should come from European Command (EUCOM) forces, these SOF operators should 
remain in close communication with SOCCENT to ensure there is a common goal all 
SOF are working toward. 
2. The In-Between: Jordan 
Jordan represents a key ally in the region with the potential to assist with interests 
in both the Levant and in the Persian Gulf. Sharing a border with Israel, a large 
Palestinian Diaspora population and a regent who has been a leader in promoting Israeli-
Palestinian peace, Jordan has an interconnected relationship with the Levant nations. 
Jordan has also committed their own SOF to assist in training Iraqi Special Operations 
Forces and has recently begun the process of admission into the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, thus demonstrating Jordan‘s commitment to the Gulf States. Finally, the 
construction of the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) and 
bi-annual hosting of the Special Operations Forces Exhibition and Conference (SOFEX) 
have positioned Jordan as a crucial hub for SOF collaboration throughout the Middle 
East.175  SOF Advisors in Jordan should work within the primary LOOs as well as 
facilitate multilateral training and collaboration. 
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3. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
Iraq is a unique situation, given the American involvement there since 2003.  
While much has been made regarding an official declaration to the end of the conflict in 
Iraq, it is still in a state of low-level turmoil, threatened by Sunni extremist networks.  
These networks take the form of franchise affiliates of transnational organizations (e.g., 
al Qaeda in Iraq) or Sunni rejectionist groups such as Jaysh Rijal Tariqah al-Naqshabandi 
(JRTN).  Additionally, recent events in Iraq demonstrate a worrisome level of Iranian 
influence within the largely Shia Iraqi government.  The current agreement between the 
United States and Iraqi government requires the withdrawal of all American troops by the 
end of 2011; however, a smaller SOF presence may be able to sustain operations in the 
future.  The traditional SOF footprint in Iraq has included three battalion sized SOTFs.176  
Many of the forces within these SOTFs have been dedicated to missions that can be 
phased out in order to focus a smaller group of operators towards roles that will pay the 
highest dividends.  These operators should focus primarily on partnering with Iraqi 
Special Operations Forces (ISOF) and Iraqi Police Emergency Response Brigade (ERB).  
These units have been nurtured and mentored by American SOF and have had the 
greatest success against insurgent networks.  While ISOF has occasionally been accused 
of executing missions based on sectarian motivations, most of these alleged incidents 
were directed by the Counter Terrorism Bureau (CTB), ISOF‘s higher civilian 
headquarters.177  Further, SOF constantly tracks both the demographic composition of 
ISOF, as well as their operational targeting in an effort to minimize their potential as a 
tool of sectarian violence.  By maintaining a partnership with these forces,  U.S. SOF can 
continue to illuminate potential sectarian influence within CTB, and compel these forces 
to resist illegal or immoral orders.  Further, this diminished footprint in Iraq would free 
up SOF to conduct the roles discussed throughout the rest of the Middle East. 
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Saudi Arabia has expressed concerns over both the threat presented by religious 
extremists and the growing attempts of Iranian hegemony. Additionally, Saudi security 
force interventions into Yemen178 and Bahrain179 demonstrate both the Saudi regime‘s 
concern over threats presented in neighboring countries and their operational reach and 
influence.  However, Saudi leaders may be disinclined to openly welcome persistent SOF 
advisors into their Kingdom or to acknowledge this relationship to their public.  While 
certain technical advisors (e.g., F-15 pilots and navigators) currently maintain a presence 
in the Saudi Kingdom, and while the Saudis reached out for SOF support in cases of a 
crisis,180 the long term presence of SOF advisors may remind the Saudi population of the 
U.S. military presence in the 1990s that caused domestic problems and reinforced jihadist 
complaints against the royal family.  Therefore, if the Saudis resist the idea of a persistent 
partnership within their borders, SOF advisors should still attempt to build relationships 
and capacity within the Saudi special operations community somewhere outside the 
country.  These initial steps could take the form of short duration joint exercises or even 
persistent training that takes places at an acceptable off-site facility (e.g., KASOTC).  
These initial steps should still be aimed at gaining further trust that will lead to the 
invitation for SOF to maintain presence within Saudi Arabia. 
Bahrain is currently the headquarters of the U.S. Navy‘s 5th Fleet and, therefore, 
most probably amenable to the idea of persistent U.S. partnership.  However, Bahrain 
now finds itself in a period of distress as the Shia majority population has been in 
sustained protest against the ruling Sunni royal family.  While this uprising was originally 
spawned as a result of the greater ―Arab Spring,‖ both Iranian influence to incite the Shia 
and the Bahraini government‘s violent and repressive response – backed by a Saudi 
intervention – have exacerbated the situation.  Therefore, advisors in Bahrain should 
work with both decision makers and internal security units in order to increase security 
and counter Iranian influence while shaping a more professional Bahraini military which 
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human rights of the citizens – much like the advisors shaped a change in civil military 
relations in El Salvador.  These advisors should seek to provide the Bahraini government 
with greater legitimacy among its people and prevent a key American ally from regime 
change which would likely result in Bahrain becoming an Iranian satellite state. 
The United Arab Emirates have a strong tradition of military exchanges with the 
United States. Recent intelligence collaboration targeting al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula suggests the Emirates would be amenable to a SOF collaboration.181  However, 
comments made by the Emirate ambassador to the United States suggest that the UAE is 
concerned with more than just transnational terror.182  Conventional military threats 
presented by a growingly belligerent Iran threaten American allies across the Gulf and, 
by extension, their relationship with the United States.  Therefore, SOF advisors in UAE 
should partner with Emirate SOF as well as building conventional military and specialty 
capabilities to counter Iran.  An example of these specialty capabilities would non-
standard maritime capabilities intended to counter the small swift boats by which Iran 
could potentially threaten Gulf sea lanes.  Kuwait, Oman and Qatar have similar reason to 
feel threatened by Iranian attempts to extend influence and power across the Gulf and 
therefore advisors in these countries should seek to develop similar capacities.  
Additionally, these states are potentially vulnerable to the threat of Iranian incitement of 
Shia populations, as in Bahrain.  Conventional Kuwaiti military units had a longstanding 
relationship with American SOF through the 1990s with Operation Iris Gold.183  
Additionally, American presence at al-Udeid Airbase suggests that Qatar would also be 
willing to host perpetual SOF advisors. 
SOCCENT should continue to designate a separate effort for Yemen until the 
multitude threats to stability and security are resolved.  No less than three primary armed 
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groups threaten security within Yemen: the Houthi rebellion in the North, the Southern 
Secessionists, and al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula.184  While these three groups have their 
own grievances and goals, they all threaten the stability of Yemen, and subsequently the 
stability of the Arabian Peninsula.  Yemeni stability is further complicated by large 
numbers of African refugees, tens of thousands annually, that immigrate to Yemen.  This 
refugee pipeline also transports guns, drugs, and other militants such as members of al 
Shabaab between the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia.185  Additionally, Yemen is 
projected to run out of fresh water within the next 10 years as a result of the 
overproduction of qat, a narcotic that most of the adult male population uses daily.186  
Yemeni stability is paramount because of the influence the country has over the Gulf of 
Aiden and the global shipping that passes through it, and because of the opportunities that 
ungoverned spaces afford terror organizations for basing and training.  As such, U.S. 
SOF employment is necessary to coerce the Yemeni government, and various 
insurgent/terrorist groups, towards a lesser level of conflict.  First, SOF would aim to 
professionalize elite police and military units, as well as train a viable coast guard to both 
increase capability and popular trust in the security apparatus.  Second, SOF would 
conduct kinetic lethal actions to kill or capture members of AQAP, even if they have dual 
membership with the Houthis or Southern Secessionists.  Finally, SOF would also enable 
Interagency resources in order to address non-military threats to stability. 
4. Adversary States 
As an overt American adversary in the Middle East and a source of much of the 
tumult this concept seeks to counter, Iran is not in the same category as the friendly and 
semi-friendly states previously addressed.  However, this does not mean that Iran is not 
susceptible to SOF influence.  The influence channels that Iran uses could be turned 
against them by SOF advisors in neighboring countries.  Further, SOF advisors could 
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potentially empower existing Iranian resistance organizations outside Iran (e.g., the 
Mujahidin-e-Khalq or MEK) in order to achieve effects within Iran.  Persistent 
engagement is necessary to shape perceptions within Iran, or prepare the environment for 
the possible future conflict. 
Similarly, Syria is an adversary that U.S. SOF can counter.  Syria‘s support for 
terrorist groups in Lebanon and Iraq is well known, and they also retain the ability to 
target Israel.187  However, instability in Syria during the Arab Spring demonstrates that 
there is a significant number of disaffected Syrians who support regime change.  Indeed, 
President Obama recently stated that President Assad must reform or step aside.188  SOF 
has the ability to help prepare for potential future conventional conflict with Syria, or 
support resistance groups from locations outside of Syrian borders.  Both options require 
SOF to be regularly employed in Middle Eastern States that border Syria.  However, any 
attempts at influencing or shaping Syria and Iran must be conducted with the utmost 
levels of discretion as these attempts may not be in keeping with the goals of the 
neighboring countries from which American SOF would undertake them. 
C. SOCCENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
Many of the problems facing friendly countries in the Middle East are shared and 
interconnected.  Likewise, American SOF, persistently engaged in the region can share 
information and create a distributed network of flexible and responsive nodes that can 
anticipate and counter various adversary organizations.  Thus, an adaptive Middle East 
security network negates the advantages afforded to these transnational networks, such as 
the ability to move easily across geographic boundaries.  However, SOCCENT must 
enable the SOF efforts in each country by being able to accurately analyze and respond to 
information provided from each of the distributed SOF operator elements throughout the 
region.  This information must be constantly compared to previous reporting from each of 
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the other nodes, in order to create a refined picture of enemy threats and develop 
appropriate measures to counter them.  Without a free and responsive flow of 
information, the reporting generated from trusted relationships within each country will 
stagnate and compartmentalize.  If this happens, this SOF empowered Arab security 
network will fall short of maximum effectiveness and likely wither away. 
The adoption of this concept would result in a regionally networked, low visibility 
and low cost forward American presence.  These operators would be uniquely suited to 
keep decision makers abreast of security threats and opportunities throughout the region, 
leverage non-SOF or interagency assets to accomplish American goals, and react through 
scalable means to crises and threats.  This would not, however, be completely free of 
costs.  In fact, this would require the constant deployment of Theater SOF, which is 
already in limited supply.  In fact, while SOF has maintained a very high operations 
tempo during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this concept would require a similar 
schedule of deployment for SOF, possibly in perpetuity.  However, these facts do not 
diminish the exponential gains that can be achieved with a relatively small, and 
politically acceptable, investment.  
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